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ISCRIMINATION in today’s workplace is largely implicit, 
making it ambiguous and often very difficult to prove. Em-
ployment discrimination scholars have proposed reforms of Title 
VII to make implicit discrimination easier to establish in court and 
to expand the kinds of situations to which liability attaches. The re-
form proposals reflect a broad consensus that strong legal norms are 
crucial to addressing the problem. Yet it is mistaken to assume that 
strengthening plaintiffs’ hands in implicit discrimination cases will 
necessarily achieve the long-term goal of reducing its occurrence. 
This Article brings together several strands of social science research 
showing that (1) implicit bias is not only invisible and largely unin-
tended, but not readily reachable through legal coercion; (2) people 
whose motivation to act in nondiscriminatory ways is based on an 
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internal commitment to nondiscriminatory norms—or “good inten-
tions”—are less likely to engage in stereotyping of others than peo-
ple who feel pressured by the law; (3) people internalize nondis-
crimination values best when they feel a sense of autonomy, 
competence, and relatedness; (4) the conditions that support these 
characteristics in the workplace include strong, unambiguous norms, 
trust, teamwork, leadership, positive example, and opportunities to 
grow and advance; and (5) excessive legal control and pressure un-
dermine people’s sense of autonomy, competence, and relatedness 
and thus their commitment to nondiscrimination norms. 
When legal pressure becomes overkill is not a matter of exact sci-
ence, and is complicated by differences among people and work-
place cultures. Still, before fashioning further legal tools that assume 
that more coercion is the answer to implicit discrimination, this Arti-
cle suggests that more attention be given to the negative impact of 
such tools and to alternative measures that may better motivate peo-
ple’s adherence to nondiscrimination norms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A developing body of social psychology research suggests  
that race and gender bias in this society1 is invisible, deep,  
and pervasive,2 and sometimes leads to discriminatory  
1 This Article addresses discrimination based primarily on race and gender. Exami-
nation of the differences between race discrimination and gender discrimination are 
beyond the scope of this Article, although the data suggest that differences do exist. 
See, e.g., Alexander M. Czopp & Margo J. Monteith, Confronting Prejudice (Liter-
ally): Reactions to Confrontations of Racial and Gender Bias, 29 Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. Bull. 532, 541–42 (2003) (finding that people feel more guilty and upset 
about offending blacks than women). This Article draws upon some social psychology 
research relating to stereotyping and bias based on age, sexual orientation, and dis-
ability, although there are differences here as well that this Article does not examine. 
2 For a review of the research on implicit bias, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 945 (2006). 
Much of the research for such conclusions is drawn from the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT), which is a computer-based test that measures time-response differentials to 
positive and negative associations related to race, sex, disability, and a number of 
other stereotype-ridden characteristics. For a description of other tests developed to 
measure implicit bias, which include not only time-response measure but also word-
fragment completion drills, priming tasks, sentence-completion tasks, and cardiovas-
cular measures, see Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social 
Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 297, 299–300 
(2003). 
 On the basis of the IAT, Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji make the “conservative 
estimate” that “seventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of Blacks) show anti-
Black bias, and seventy-five percent of men and women” associate female with family 
more easily than they do with career. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Meas-
ures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1063, 
1072 (2006); see also Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and 
Beliefs From a Demonstration Web Site, 6 Group Dynamics: Theory, Res., & Prac. 
101, 112 (2002) (finding that IAT research indicates that all social groups hold implicit 
biases, regardless of age, gender, race, and political views). 
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behavior.3 While some scholars criticize the methodology and con-
clusions of the research,4 there can be little doubt that people do 
act in unconsciously discriminatory ways and that this discrimina-
tion is very difficult to regulate. For example, people often respond 
to members of other groups with lack of eye contact and warmth, 
3 See Anthony M. Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Atti-
tudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 Psychol. Rev. 4, 7 (1995); see also 
Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 2, at 961 (evidence that implicit bias leads to dis-
criminatory behavior is “already substantial”); Anthony M. Greenwald et al., Under-
standing and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Va-
lidity, 97 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 17 (2009) (meta-analysis of IAT research 
suggests that IAT predicts discriminatory behavior); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of 
Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1514 (2005) (“persuasive evidence” that implicit bias 
predicts disparate behavior). 
4 For a sampling of the critiques, see Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions 
of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?,” 
15 Psychol. Inquiry 257 (2004) (implicit bias research measures cultural stereotypes 
rather than personal animus, and results can be explained by factors other than preju-
dice); Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a 
Measure, 34 Ann. Rev. Soc. 277 (2008) (evidence suggests that people sometimes lack 
control over the cause and consequences of their racial biases, but not that they are 
unconsciously racist); Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reas-
sessing the Predictive Validity of the IAT, 94 J. Applied Psychol. 567 (2009) (IAT re-
sults do not permit predictions of individual-level behaviors, and when various meth-
odological factors are taken into account, are more consistent with pro-black than 
anti-black bias); Miguel C. Brendl et al., How Do Indirect Measures of Evaluation 
Work? Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice in the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 760 (2001) (results on IAT test can be explained by fac-
tors other than implicit prejudice); Andrew Karpinski & James L. Hilton, Attitudes 
and the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 774 (2001) (IAT 
reflects exposure to stereotypes but not endorsement thereof); Gregory Mitchell & 
Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 Ohio St. 
L.J. 1023 (2006) (implicit prejudice research lacks construct and content validity, ig-
nores high error rates and alternative explanations for alleged discriminatory behav-
ior, and draws naïve conclusions about link between laboratory results and the real 
world).  
 Philip Tetlock and Gregory Mitchell see the debate between IAT proponents and 
critics as part of a long-running impasse between a point of view that sees prejudice as 
ubiquitous and thinks it is the government’s role to stop it (which they call the “sta-
tist-intervention” position), and an approach that believes in the power of competi-
tion to eliminate irrational biases (which they call the “market-purist” position). Tet-
lock and Mitchell conclude that both sides should back off of their non-falsifiable 
propositions and join in “adversarial collaboration” based on shared standards of 
proof. See Philip E. Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Implicit Bias and Accountability 
Systems: What Must Organizations Do to Prevent Discrimination?, 28 Research in 
Organizational Behavior (Barry Straw & Arthur Brief, eds., forthcoming 2009), avail-
able at http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/ImplicitBiasinOrganizationsand 
AdversarialCollaboration.pdf. 
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tensing of facial muscles, increased blinking, anxious voice tone, 
embarrassing slips of the tongue, awkward social interactions, and 
maintenance of physical distance and formality.5 These behaviors 
can lower the performance level of those whose presence has pro-
voked them,6 and yet these behaviors are too minor and too com-
mon to constitute the type of employment action that could be rea-
sonably banned by nondiscrimination law. Another example is that 
people form impressions about others based on unconscious 
stereotypes, which color what information about them is noticed 
and remembered, and how it is evaluated;7 typically, however, at no 
discernible point in this chain of accumulated impressions is dis-
crimination readily apparent or provable. Further complicating the 
matter is that people often perceive differently the experiences and 
events on which discrimination claims are based. They can partici-
pate in the same allegedly discriminatory incident, each confident 
about what they saw, but not agree just what happened.8 Given 
5 See Jennifer Crocker et al., Social Stigma, in Handbook of Social Psychology 504, 
513 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and 
Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 62, 63 
(2002); Susan T. Fiske, What We Know About the Problem of the Century: Lessons 
from Social Science to the Law, and Back, in Handbook of Employment Discrimina-
tion Research: Rights and Realities 59, 60, 63 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nel-
son eds., 2005). 
6 The classic work on this subject is Carl O. Word, The Nonverbal Mediation of 
Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction, 10 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 109, 119 
(1974) (negative nonverbal behaviors produced poorer performance in job interview 
setting among both whites and blacks). See also Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, 
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 797, 805–06 (1995) (subtle cues that remind ethnic minor-
ity students of their stigmatized status undermines achievement on academic tests). 
7 See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 
1161, 1167, 1209, 1213 (1995). 
8 See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding and Ad-
dressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup 
Identity Model, 61 J. Soc. Issues 615, 625 (2005) (describing research revealing that 
whites and blacks perceive of the same encounters in different ways, without being 
aware of their different perceptions); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 
108 Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (2008). In the criminal context, see Dan M. Kahan et al., 
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 838 (2009) (describing psychological disposition of in-
dividuals to observe and resolve disputed facts in a manner supportive of their group 
identities); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decision-
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these kinds of impediments to proving discrimination that is un-
conscious or implicit, it is small wonder that employment discrimi-
nation plaintiffs are far less likely than other civil plaintiffs to win 
their cases,9 and that, faced with the low prospect of success, fed-
eral employment discrimination case filings and terminations have 
dropped almost forty percent in the past decade.10 
Legal commentators have responded to the growing research 
about the pervasiveness of implicit bias and the poor success re-
cord of plaintiffs with proposals that would expand liability stan-
dards and make it easier for plaintiffs to prove discrimination in Ti-
tle VII cases. Some scholars favor use of presumptions that would 
require findings of discrimination, even when explanations other 
than discrimination are no less likely. One scholar suggests a new 
liability category for ambiguous circumstances that “outsiders” 
would recognize as discriminatory although “insiders” would not. 
Others would impose liability on employers for the failure to adopt 
workplace procedures and structures that might have prevented 
discrimination from occurring, even when the link between existing 
procedures and structures and actual race or gender bias cannot be 
proved.11 
making, and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345 (2007) (suggesting that judges and 
jurors misremember case facts in racially biased ways). 
9 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plain-
tiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 103, 110 display 2 
(2009) (defendants are almost three times more likely to win on appeal of plaintiffs’ 
wins at pretrial than plaintiffs are to win on appeal of defendants’ pretrial wins, and 
defendants are more than four times more likely than plaintiffs to win appeals of trial 
verdicts); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. Empirical Legal Studies 429 (2004) (employment 
discrimination plaintiffs are four times as likely to lose in the pre-trial litigation stage 
as plaintiffs in other civil cases, twice as likely to lose at trial, and four times as likely 
to have their verdicts overturned on appeal). The win rate of Title VII cases filed in 
federal court between 1998 and 2006 was just over ten percent. Clermont & Schwab, 
From Bad to Worse?, supra, at 117 display 6. 
10 See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse?, supra note 9, at 115–18 (termina-
tion of federal employment discrimination cases fell from 23,721 in 1999 to 15,007 in 
2007); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment 
Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 14 (ABA Research Paper No. 08-
04, Apr. 16, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093313 (federal employment 
discrimination filings dropped from 23,796 in fiscal year 1997 to 14,353 in fiscal year 
2006). 
11 See infra Section II.B. 
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That more aggressive legal solutions to address the elusive prob-
lem of implicit discrimination are sought is not surprising. Title VII 
has significantly reduced workplace discrimination; perhaps if the 
law can be made even stricter, it can eliminate even more of it. 
More of a good thing, however, is not always better. One problem 
with relying on more law to reduce discrimination, already noted 
by other scholars, is that law is an ineffective instrument for elimi-
nating behaviors we cannot readily define or correct. Amy Wax ar-
gues that imposing liability on employers for a phenomenon they 
cannot discern and do not know how to prevent leads them to 
overinvest in precautions that may reduce the danger of liability 
while not actually reducing the influence of unconscious bias on 
decisionmaking.12 Another problem, about which Susan Sturm has 
written extensively, is that individual lawsuits address only individ-
ual behaviors and not the structural features of the workplace that 
enable discrimination to occur. According to Sturm, broader insti-
tutional strategies are necessary to confront the structural forces 
that mask and facilitate discrimination in the workplace and chan-
nel decisionmaking into more nondiscriminatory patterns.13 Still 
another response, made forcefully by Ralph Richard Banks and 
Richard Thompson Ford, is that the focus on implicit bias is mis-
placed because the law already treats unconscious and conscious 
bias the same and because unconscious bias discourse confuses and 
derails the real goal of anti-racism, which is the elimination of en-
trenched racial inequalities.14 
12 See Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129, 1133 (1999). Wax 
argues that Title VII covers unconscious as well as conscious discrimination, but still 
requires that discrimination be proved. See Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: 
Define It, Prove It, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 979 (2008). 
13 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Struc-
tural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 460–61 (2001); see also Susan Sturm, The 
Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Education, 29 
Harv. J.L. & Gender 247 (2006) (suggesting that institutional reform is more promis-
ing than legal reform in making universities more inclusive). 
14 Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias 
Matter?: Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 Emory L.J. 1053, 1058–59, 1072–89, 
1113–21 (2009); see also Charles Lawrence III, Unconscious Racism Revisited: Re-
flections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection,” 40 
Conn. L. Rev. 931, 942 (2008) (arguing that the emphasis on unconscious bias has di-
verted attention from the ideology and material structures of white supremacy). 
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This Article assumes that unconscious discrimination is a prob-
lem worthy of focus, both from the perspective of achieving non-
discrimination in the workplace and in reducing the larger societal 
disparities based on race and gender. It also sides with those schol-
ars who believe that Title VII already prohibits unconscious as well 
as conscious race and gender discrimination.15 The Article’s pur-
pose, however, is not to establish the scale and significance of the 
unconscious discrimination problem, or to defend existing law as 
ideal. Instead, it  cautions against approaches to unconscious dis-
crimination—whatever its prevalence and whatever the inadequa-
cies of existing law—that rely principally on stronger legal coercion 
as the primary tool to fight implicit discrimination. The problem 
the Article identifies is that coercion, despite its necessity in many 
circumstances, can have a negative effect on people’s internaliza-
tion of nondiscrimination norms. Aggressive legal strategies as-
sume that the stronger the legal pressure, the more effective it will 
be in reducing undesirable behaviors. This Article makes the case 
that, specifically in the context of behaviors based on implicit bias, 
just the opposite may be true. 
The potentially counter-productive nature of law with respect to 
implicit bias is rooted in many factors, not the least of which is that 
people are not aware of their biases, and are highly sensitive to cir-
cumstances in which others may think that they are prejudiced. 
When caught (by themselves or by others) doing or saying some-
thing that might be viewed as racist or sexist, people tend to re-
spond by saying (or thinking to themselves), “I didn’t mean it that 
way.” How others respond to this reaction itself reflects a profound 
difference in perspective about nondiscrimination goals and the 
way to achieve them. Some see such protestations of innocence as 
a form of self-deception or self-rationalization that should be ex-
posed.16 People are prone to have self-serving, negative thoughts 
15 See Banks & Ford, supra note 14, at 1072–89 (arguing that Title VII may not be 
adequate, but the problem is not that it treats conscious and unconscious bias differ-
ently); Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129, 1146–52 (1999) 
(reading Title VII and the cases applying it to prohibit both conscious and uncon-
scious discrimination). 
16 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 387 (1987) (implying that the intent 
requirement in antidiscrimination law rationalizes the status of the privileged who do 
not intentionally discriminate); David Wellman, Unconscious Racism, Social Cogni-
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that will find expression in their actions if not apprehended and 
corrected. Only when people are confronted and held liable for 
their prejudice, whenever and however it can be identified, will 
they stop discriminating. The important thing, this line of reasoning 
goes, is to name the wrong and hold people accountable for it. 
Anything less simply enables bias to flourish. Since discrimination 
is ubiquitous, there is little chance we will overcorrect for it.17 
An alternative theory—the one elevated by this Article—is that 
threat and confrontation about race and gender bias, which people 
do not want to possess or exhibit, may inadvertently provoke 
shame, guilt, and resentment, which lead to avoidance and resis-
tance, and ultimately to more stereotyping. In other words, pres-
sure and threat will often deepen bias rather than correct it. Posi-
tive strategies that affirm people’s good intentions, in contrast, 
engage people constructively in defining their better, nondiscrimi-
natory selves and aligning their conduct accordingly. While coer-
cion and threat make people defensive, opportunity and engage-
ment leverage people’s good intentions into a deeper commitment 
to a more inclusive, nondiscriminatory workplace. It is this type of 
commitment—not legal coercion—that will best address the im-
plicit bias that is most characteristic of today’s workplace. 
Much scholarly attention has already been given to the need for 
strong legal standards to combat today’s workplace discrimina-
tion.18 This Article endorses the need for strong standards, but ar-
gues that attention also needs to be given to the means by which 
internal commitment to those standards, or what I refer to as good 
intentions, is generated. Some researchers have suggested that 
good intentions, even if effective against explicit forms of bias, are 
tion Theory, and the Legal Intent Doctrine: The Neuron Fires Next Time, in Hand-
book of the Sociology of Racial and Ethnic Relations 39 (Hernán Vera & Joe R. 
Feagin eds., 2005) (exposing the extent to which racial advantage is invisible and ra-
tionalized); see also Banks & Ford, supra note 14, at 1104–05 (criticizing unconscious 
bias discourse because it permits people to affirm their self-image as non-racist). 
17 See Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in 
Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415, 482 (2000). 
18 Among some recent examples, see Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as 
Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 851–
53 (2007); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 
1103 (2008). 
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largely ineffective to stop implicit discrimination.19 This Article 
posits, to the contrary, that good intentions have their greatest 
comparative advantage when it comes to the more subtle forms of 
discriminatory behavior, and that people who have an internal 
commitment to nondiscrimination norms will combat implicit dis-
crimination more effectively than those motivated by traditional 
legal sanctions. The Article also points toward strategies that will 
best encourage that internal commitment. 
Social science research suggests that people are most likely to in-
ternalize norms when they feel autonomous, competent, and re-
lated to others.20 Coercion threatens these core prerequisites of the 
internalization process because it leads people to feel controlled, 
untrusted, and alienated. Coercion with respect to race and gender 
bias seems to be particularly threatening. Thus, while clear, firm, 
and enforceable legal standards are necessary in order to define 
basic limits on discriminatory behavior, when these standards come 
to feel unfair or overly controlling, they evoke guilt, resentment, 
and resistance—all reactions that actually increase stereotyping. 
When people feel that the rules are unfair or coercive, the most 
that usually can be achieved is rote compliance. Rote compliance 
by those who are resigned or indifferent, perhaps even hostile, to 
nondiscrimination norms may be enough with respect to explicit 
forms of discrimination, but it will not achieve significant headway 
against implicit discrimination. To reach beyond such behaviors 
requires people who are committed to nondiscrimination norms 
and determined to live by them. 
19 See, e.g., John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Control-
lability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in Dual-Process Theories of Social Psychol-
ogy 361, 361, 362, 376, 378 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999) (noting there 
is little that can be done to control influence of automatic stereotypes; the de-
activation of unconscious stereotypes would require the almost unimaginable combi-
nation of a person being aware of the nonconscious influences, having a relatively ac-
curate theory about the nature of those influences, and being sufficiently motivated 
and skilled to correct for them); Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1079 (“[A]n explicit 
ex ante exhortation not to be intentionally unfair will do little to counter implicit cog-
nitive processes, which take place outside our awareness yet influence our behav-
ior.”). 
20 See Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pur-
suits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 Psychol. Inquiry 227 
(2000) (citing studies); see infra Subsection III.B.2. 
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In focusing on good intentions, the goal of the Article is not to 
argue that people who engage in unintended discrimination should 
be let off the hook. Title VII, correctly read, prohibits discrimina-
tion based on race, sex, and other protected characteristics, 
whether or not the discrimination was intended. Where cases of 
implicit discrimination can be proved, defendants should be held 
responsible. The Article recognizes that many cases of implicit dis-
crimination cannot be readily proved. It argues, however, that this 
fact has more to do with the complexities of implicit discrimination 
than with deficiencies in existing law. Too much of the current aca-
demic discussion assumes from the prevalence of implicit bias that 
tougher laws are necessary, and would be able to, combat it. Look-
ing more closely at the social science about the effects of coercion 
on reducing discrimination, this Article demonstrates that the mat-
ter is not so simple. 
The Article may appear to focus on changing potential discrimi-
nators at the expense of justice for deserving victims. But it is un-
realistic to think that making it substantially easier to prove dis-
crimination will either promote justice or reduce the kinds of 
discrimination that people do not intend and of which they are not 
aware. Even if some benefits might be expected, any short-term 
gains must be weighed against the long-term effects of more legal 
pressure, which requires attention to the impact of these rules on 
people’s attitudes and beliefs. Without proposing to make anything 
worse for plaintiffs or weakening Title VII in its present form, the 
Article outlines the principles that might help us to think about 
that impact. 
The Article may also seem naïvely optimistic about the change-
ability of human nature. If a change of attitudes is to be a possibil-
ity, however, that possibility must be entertained. Good intentions 
are not the only factor that matters in reducing discrimination,21 
and the Article makes clear that they should not be a free pass to 
discrimination,22 but they are a form of social capital that should be 
fostered, like any other asset. They can be nurtured, or they can be 
squandered. It pays to pay attention to the difference. 
21 Nor are good intentions sufficient. They may, however, make the difference be-
tween whether or not other specific strategies to reduce bias actually work. See infra 
Part IV. 
22 See infra Section III.A. 
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This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will examine the psy-
chological dimensions of workplace discrimination. It will describe 
both the cognitive and the motivated processes of dimensions of 
bias and stereotyping, as they contribute to the general phenome-
non of implicit discrimination. It will demonstrate that, despite the 
near-exclusive emphasis on cognitive stereotyping in the legal lit-
erature, motivation is a key component in the processes entailed in 
implicit discrimination. Part II will address the law of employment 
discrimination, briefly explaining the extent to which Title VII al-
ready prohibits implicit as well as explicit discrimination. This Part 
will also describe proposed reforms to existing law that are aimed 
at making Title VII more effective in combating unintended dis-
crimination. Part III will review social science literature about the 
role of motivation in reducing stereotyping. This Part will stress (1) 
the significance of the difference between external and internal 
motivation to norm compliance, (2) the importance of autonomy, 
competence and connectedness to a person’s ability to internalize 
norms, and (3) the positive and the negative roles the law can play 
in enhancing people’s intentional commitment to comply with 
nondiscrimination norms. Part IV will examine the social science 
research evaluating measures to reduce prejudice. Some of the re-
search focuses on the role of individual effort and attention in re-
ducing bias, and some of it focuses on situational influences rang-
ing from counterstereotype images to peer interaction, social 
norms, and workplace intergroup contact. The research demon-
strates that the effects of both individual effort and situational 
change depend significantly on whether people are externally or 
internally motivated to reduce prejudice. Part V will analyze the 
implications of these research findings for legal and workplace 
strategies to reduce implicit discrimination. 
I. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF RACE AND GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION 
There is general agreement that discrimination based on explic-
itly negative attitudes about race and sex has diminished over 
time,23 and that a growing portion of discrimination is unconscious 
23 Sources documenting the decline in racism and sexism since the 1940s include 
Richard J. Crisp & Rhiannon N. Turner, Essential Social Psychology 166–68 (2007); 
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and unintended.24 Some believe that discrimination changes form 
more than it actually diminishes.25 This belief is often associated 
with an account of discrimination as an ideological instrument of 
Howard Schuman et al., Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations 
104–05 (1997); John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The 
Third Wave, 57 J. Soc. Issues 829, 930–31 (2001); Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The 
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 491 (1996). 
 As more explicit forms of racism and sexism declined, so evolved the terms used to 
name each. Thus, what was once considered “racism” later came to be referred to as 
“old-fashioned racism” or “dominative racism,” and was then replaced by terms en-
compassing more subtle forms, called “modern racism,” and later “symbolic,” “am-
bivalence,” “aversive,” and (more generally) “implicit” racism. See Joel Kovel, White 
Racism: A Psychohistory 54 (1970) (discussing dominative racism); John Duckitt, The 
Social Psychology of Prejudice 19–24 (1992) (discussing symbolic racism); Samuel L. 
Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism: Bias Without Intention, in Handbook of Employ-
ment Discrimination Research 377 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 
2005) (discussing aversive racism); see also John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Con-
temporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 Soc. Issues 829 (2001) (giving a historical 
overview of study of racism, with focus on aversive racism). 
 The study of sexism over time has produced a similar progression of terms. See 
Janet K. Swim et al., Sexism and Racism: Old-Fashioned and Modern Prejudices, 68 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 199 (1995) (comparing Old-Fashioned Sexism and Mod-
ern Sexism); Francine Tougas et al., Neo-Sexism: Plus Ça Change, Plus C’est Pareil, 
21 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 842 (1995) (discussing neo-sexism); Peter Glick et 
al., Beyond Prejudice as Simple Antipathy: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism Across 
Cultures, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 763 (2000) (comparing hostile and benevo-
lent sexism); Glick & Fiske, supra (discussing ambivalent sexism). 
24 Several scholars have observed that the trends in today’s workplace present more 
opportunities for the subtle forms of discrimination than were possible in prior gen-
erations. These trends include the flattening of workplace hierarchies, blurring of job 
boundaries, allocation of work in teams rather than to individuals, adoption of more 
skill-based, individualistic, and flexible methods of workplace evaluation, and reduc-
tion in job security. See Katherine V. W. Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment 
Regulation for the Changing Workplace 174–83 (2004); Tristin K. Green, Discrimina-
tion in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment 
Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91, 93, 101–03 (2003); see also Cynthia Estlund, 
Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy (2003). 
25 See, e.g., Faye Crosby et al., Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Dis-
crimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 Psychol. Bull. 546 (1980) (docu-
menting continued racial bias, in the face of public opinion polls appearing to show 
the decline of racism); Olatunde Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 374 
(2007) (arguing that continued racial disparities show that racism still exists); Lincoln 
Quillian, New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32 
Ann. Rev. Soc. 299, 302–09 (2006) (describing audit studies that show a persistence of 
race discrimination in housing and employment, despite evidence that negative racial 
attitudes have declined). 
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group power,26 in which privileged groups take “strategic, self-
interested actions” to “intentionally exclude and exploit subordi-
nate-group members [in order] to protect or advance their own in-
terests.”27 By this account, the privileged rationalize their subordi-
nation of others through self-serving ideologies that change with 
the time. Under Jim Crow, segregation was justified on the basis of 
the inferiority of blacks,28 and the failure to give women the vote 
was rationalized by the separate spheres of men and women dic-
tated by God and nature.29 Today’s racist and sexist practices are 
said to be sustained more subtly, but no less insidiously, through 
purportedly neutral principles such as equality, difference, and the 
free market.30 Even the victims of discrimination are drawn to these 
ideologies, thereby helping to perpetuate their own subordination. 
According to system justification theory, believing that one lives in 
26 See Lawrence D. Bobo, Prejudice as Group Position: Microfoundations of a So-
ciological Approach to Racism and Race Relations, 55 J. Soc. Issues 445, 447 (1999) 
(developing a group position approach); Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of 
Employment Discrimination, 29 Contemporary Soc. 319, 321 (2000) (concluding that 
sociologists see prejudice as a “fundamental mechanism of stratification through 
which dominant groups preserve their privileged position”). 
27 Reskin, supra note 26, at 320. 
28 See Bobo, supra note 26, at 464 (describing the Jim Crow belief that blacks are 
inferior to whites). 
29 See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concur-
ring) (separate spheres of men and women is “founded in the divine ordinance, as 
well as in the nature of things”). 
30 In the context of race, Lawrence Bobo refers to this as “laissez-faire racism.” See 
Bobo, supra note 26, at 464–65. In the context of sex, Catharine A. MacKinnon calls 
the theory that neutral principles such as objectivity, equality, and free speech are 
constructed so as to protect men’s interests and subordinate women “feminism un-
modified.” See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life 
and Law 48–62 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the 
State 157–70 (1989).  There are a number of variations on this theme. See, e.g., David 
O. Sears et al., Egalitarian Values and Contemporary Racial Politics, in Racialized 
Politics: The Debate About Racism in America 75, 79 (David O. Sears et al. eds., 
2000) (suggesting that negative views toward race today are fused with race-neutral 
traditional American values, such as individualism, the work ethic, delay of gratifica-
tion, patriotism, and respect for authority); Jim Sidanius & Felicia Pratto, Social 
Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression (1999) (tying 
opposition to race-targeted policies to the desire for group dominance); Paul M. 
Sniderman & Edward G. Carmines, Reaching Beyond Race, 30 PS: Political Science 
& Politics 466, 471 (1997) (stating that differences in racial policy beliefs today are 
about politics, not race). 
BARTLETT_BOOK 11/18/2009  6:10 PM 
2009] Making Good on Good Intentions 1907 
 
a rational, fair, and orderly world is often preferable to believing 
that one is a victim in a fundamentally unjust society.31 
This group-position account of discrimination helps explain the 
sustenance of power and privilege at a deep institutional level, 
even in societies that appear to be moving in a politically progres-
sive direction. On its own terms, however, this account limits po-
tential strategies for reducing discrimination to the pursuit of con-
vergent interests between those who have power and those who do 
not,32 or to punishing those who violate the favorable rules that 
emerge from these political deals. For the most part, it takes peo-
ple at their self-interested worst, and suggests no mechanisms or 
strategies for transformative attitudinal and institutional change 
Acknowledging the force of this theory, this Article is premised 
on an alternative, more optimistic account, which relies on more 
31 See Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Impli-
cations for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1119 (2006); John 
T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System Justification and 
the Production of False Consciousness, 33 Brit. J. Soc. Psychol. 1 (1994). System justi-
fication theory, although rooted in social psychology rather than sociology, is congru-
ent with other ideology-based theories according to which people reconcile them-
selves to the world they live in, rather than confront its injustices, such as the theory 
of cognitive dissonance, and the “just world” thesis. See, e.g., Leon Festinger, A The-
ory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957); Melvin J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World: A 
Fundamental Delusion (1980). Belief in a just world lessens the likelihood that mem-
bers of lower-status groups will perceive discrimination when rejected for a job posi-
tion, and increases the chances that members of higher-status groups will blame their 
rejection on discrimination. See Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Map-
ping the Social-Psychological Forces and Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 
16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 679, 688 (2007) (surveying research); see also MacKinnon, 
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, supra note 30, at 114 (arguing that women are 
pushed by the dominant, male perspective to see reality in male terms that denies 
their oppression, even though it contradicts some of their lived experience); Peter 
Glick et al., Beyond Prejudice as Simply Antipathy: Hostile and Benevolent Sexism 
Across Cultures, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 763, 773 (2000) (women adopt 
stereotypes about themselves as a form of self-defense and survival). For discussion of 
how ideologies and situational factors are “mutually reinforcing” in stimulating group 
competition and prejudice, see Victoria M. Esses et al., Instrumental Relations 
Among Groups: Group Competition, Conflict, and Prejudice, in On the Nature of 
Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport 227, 233 (John F. Dovidio et al. eds., 2005). 
32 The interest-convergence thesis is set forth in Derrick Bell, Diversity’s Distrac-
tions, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1622, 1624 (2003); see also Derrick A. Bell Jr., Brown v. 
Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518, 
523 (1980) (suggesting that progress of blacks occurs only when it serves the interests 
of whites). For a critique, see Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence 
Thesis (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review). 
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nuanced and less totalizing explanations for race and gender dis-
crimination. This account allows for the existence of well-intended 
people, assumes they can make a difference, treats people’s atti-
tudes and behaviors as changeable, and posits that social and insti-
tutional contexts can influence that change. It thus emphasizes how 
best to bring about this change. 
This Part reviews basic social science about stereotyping, preju-
dice, and discrimination. It uses the standard social science distinc-
tions between a stereotype, which is a faulty generalization about a 
group or its members; prejudice or bias, which is the positive or 
negative attitude that can attach to a stereotype; and discrimina-
tion, which is negative treatment based on stereotype and prejudice 
that may follow.33 In studying these phenomena, some scholars 
have distinguished single acts of biased individuals from the larger 
and more significant institutional context in which discrimination is 
enabled.34 This Article treats the relationship between the two as 
the critical factor. The attitudes and beliefs of individuals about 
race and gender not only are shaped by, but also shape, the social 
and institutional contexts of which they are part. Neither can be 
improved without some understanding of the interaction with the 
other. This Part focuses primarily on the processes of individual 
stereotyping. Parts III and IV will put individual stereotyping in 
broader situational context. 
A. Stereotyping as Social Cognition 
Stereotypes are categories that constrain and shape what a per-
son believes about, and expects from, other people.35 According to 
social cognition theory, people are drawn to those categories that 
are the most visible, or salient, such as gender, race, and age.36 Con-
33 Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella, An Introduction, in Discrimination at 
Work: The Psychological and Organization Bases 1–2 (Robert L. Dipboye & Adri-
enne Colella eds., 2005). 
34 See, e.g., Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Meas-
ures at the Relational Level, 59 Hastings L.J. 1435, 1450–52 (2008); Sturm, Second-
Generation Discrimination, supra note 13, at 466–71; Wellman, supra note 16, at 53. 
35 Diane M. Mackie et al., Social Psychological Foundations of Stereotype Forma-
tion, in Stereotypes and Stereotyping 41, 42–43 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996). 
36 See Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in Dual-
Process Theories, supra note 19, at 231, 232–34 (stating that gender, ethnicity and age 
are “privileged” social categories because they are immediately physically manifested 
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text can increase or decrease category salience. For example, a 
black female’s gender is likely to be salient in a group of men, 
whereas her race will tend to be more salient in a group of white 
women.37 
Categories help to sort, store, and retrieve information, with an 
efficiency that would not be possible if each person, object, and 
situation had to be encountered as an entirely individualized phe-
nomenon.38 Useful as they are, however, categories also distort 
and have important cultural meanings that are often relevant to people’s immediate 
interaction goals); David L. Hamilton et al., Social Cognition and the Study of Stereo-
typing, in Social Cognition: Impact on Social Psychology 291, 311–12 (Patricia G. De-
vine et al. eds., 1994) (citing research suggesting that these categories are based on 
basic and unalterable biological differences and reflect other differences on a variety 
of other attributes). The importance of these traits as organizational categories is ap-
parent even in young children. See, e.g., Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, 
The Development of Implicit Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Ages 6 
and 10 and Adulthood, 17 Psychol. Sci. 53, 56 (2006). Children appear to use gender 
even earlier than race or age to categorize people. See Mackie et al., supra note 35, at 
46–47. 
 The commonality of gender, race, and age as cross-cultural categories does not 
mean that perceptual tendencies are uniform across cultures. For example, some re-
search indicates that East Asians perceive objects and people more situationally, in 
their contextual frameworks, than Americans, while Americans are more likely to 
make assumptions about people’s dispositions and personality traits. For a review of 
some of the studies and some original research involving Japanese research subjects, 
see Takahiko Masuda & Richard E. Nisbett, Attending Holistically Versus Analyti-
cally: Comparing the Context Sensitivity of Japanese and Americans, 81 J. Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. 922 (2001). 
37 See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. 
Experimental Psychol.: Gen. 455, 459 (2003). The more extreme the characteristics, 
the more salient, and thus the more likely they are to trigger stereotypes. See Irene V. 
Blair et al., The Role of Afrocentric Features in Person Perception: Judging by Fea-
tures and Categories, 83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5 (2002) (finding that skin 
tone, eyes, nose shape and size, lips, and hair texture determined how quickly blacks 
are categorized by race, and thus to be judged by racial stereotypes); Devon Carbado 
& Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1259 (2000) (suggesting that 
race-associated behaviors enhance stereotyping). 
38 As stated by Gordon Allport, who is widely credited with the development of so-
cial categorization theory upon which others have built, “The human mind must think 
with the aid of categories [or] generalizations. Once formed, categories are the basis 
for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living de-
pends upon it.” Gordon Allport, The Nature of Prejudice 20 (1954). Stereotypes also 
serve social functions such as by signaling whether one should offer one’s seat on a 
crowded bus (to, say, a disabled or elderly person), or whether it is all right to ask 
someone for a glass of water (say, a waitress), a book (a librarian), or for help (a po-
lice officer). See Mark Snyder & Peter Miene, On the Functions of Stereotypes and 
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people’s judgments about the world. For one thing, they cause 
people to perceive things and people within a category as being 
more alike than if the category did not exist, and those in different 
categories as more different.39 This tendency has been demon-
strated in experiments in which people estimate lines grouped in 
the same category as more similar in length, and more different 
from lines in other groups, than they actually are.40 They do the 
same thing with people.41 
Categories also lead people to attribute to all members of a 
category characteristics possessed by only some of them. In other 
words, people over-generalize from a “representative” few to the 
many.42 As put by Gordon Allport in 1954, a child thinks that “all 
houses must have, as his house has, two floors, a gas refrigerator, 
and a television set.”43 So, too, people often assume that other peo-
ple who are alike in one respect, like race or sex, are also alike in 
others.44 
Once generalizations based on categories are fixed in people’s 
minds, the way they process information perpetuates those gener-
alizations. They notice, ask questions about, remember, and inte-
grate information that confirms their previously formed views,45 
Prejudice, in 7 The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium, 33, 46 (Mark P. 
Zanna & James M. Olson eds., 1994). 
39 See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The 
Common Ingroup Identity Model 35 (2000). Applied to social groups, this is called 
the “out-group homogeneity effect.” See Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine 
Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects in Natural and Minimal Groups, 112 Psy-
chol. Bull. 536 (1992). 
40 See Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice, 25 J. Soc. Issues, Autumn 1969, 
at 79, 83–86 (1969); Henri Tajfel & A.L. Wilkes, Classification and Quantitative 
Judgement, 54 Brit. J. Psychol. 101, 104 (1963).   
41 See infra text accompanying notes 56–58. 
42 These overgeneralized attributions are called illusory correlations. See David L. 
Hamilton et al., The Influence of Affect on Stereotyping: The Case of Illusory Corre-
lations, in Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Per-
ception 39, 44 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993). 
43 Allport, supra note 38, at 171. Allport reports that “[f]or many years Americans 
imagined that all Bolsheviks wore whiskers.” Id. at 132. 
44 Citing some of the basic sources, see Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and 
Discrimination, in 2 The Handbook of Social Psychology 357, 362 (Daniel T. Gilbert 
et al. eds., 1998). 
45 For studies of “confirmation bias,” see Steven L. Neuberg, Expectancy-
Confirmation Processes in Stereotype-Tinged Social Encounters: The Moderating 
Role of Social Goals, in 7 The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium 103, 
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while they tend to ignore, forget, or explain away contradictory in-
formation.46 
B. Stereotyping as Motivated Prejudice 
In a widely influential article, Linda Hamilton Krieger argues 
that intergroup bias is largely a result of cognitive functioning, of 
the type just summarized.47 As such, she argues, it is unintentional, 
and thus not captured by Title VII, which she claims does not cover 
unintended discrimination.48 I address later what I believe to be the 
overstated claim that Title VII covers only intended discrimina-
tion.49 In this Section, I focus on the social science research demon-
strating that categorization is not only a cognitive mechanism, but 
also a motivated one. This point is important because if motivation 
is an integral part of the stereotyping process, strategies to reduce 
stereotyping and discrimination must address the motivational 
components as well as the cognitive ones. 
People bring various motivations to how they view others, espe-
cially the need to belong, to control, to possess, to understand, to 
feel safe, and to feel good about themselves.50 Whether these needs 
are met affects people’s responses to others, including whether 
they judge others based on stereotypes. 
A principal form of motivated bias is the tendency for people to 
classify themselves into one social category and out of others, and 
108 (1994). Because of this bias, it is not necessary for a thing or person to be differ-
ent; it is enough that they appear to be different. See Allport, supra note 38, at 132. 
46 See Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, supra note 44, at 368. Re-
searchers have referred to the process by which the impact of disconfirming informa-
tion may be diffused as “prototype subtyping.” See Miles Hewstone, Contact and 
Categorization: Social Psychological Interventions to Change Intergroup Relations, in 
Stereotypes and Stereotyping 323, 338–41 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996); see also 
sources in infra note 55. 
47 See Krieger, supra note 7, at 1165. 
48 Id. at 1239. 
49 See infra Section II.A. 
50 See Susan T. Fiske, Intent and Ordinary Bias: Unintended Thought and Social 
Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 117, 123–24 (2004). For a fuller 
discussion of human needs that bear on prejudice, see Section III.A. For sources de-
scribing earlier understandings of the needs that produced race prejudice as patholo-
gies, see John Duckitt, The Social Psychology of Prejudice 52–54 (1992); Fiske, supra 
note 44, at 358–59. 
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to favor those in their own category.51 This tendency is often re-
ferred to as “ingroup” bias, which is mirrored by the corresponding 
tendency to disfavor members of the “outgroup.”52 People bring 
their biases favoring members of their ingroup and disfavoring 
outgroup members to their cognitive tendencies to make illusory 
correlations, confirm existing biases, and view things in the same 
category as more alike than they actually are.53 These processes af-
fect how people notice, digest, and remember information about 
others.54 For example, people tend to notice and retain more de-
tailed information for ingroup members; in interview settings they 
ask more questions and the questions are designed to obtain indi-
viduating information about ingroup members. In contrast, people 
tend to notice and retain information about outgroup members 
that conforms to stereotypes about that group; in interview set-
tings, they ask fewer questions and those they ask are designed to 
confirm what they expect, not change it.55 As Steven Neuberg 
states, when people hold strong stereotypes of certain groups, 
“they often cannot help but take note of the many individuals who 
are indeed as they expected them to be.”56 
People exhibit ingroup bias by responding to members of their 
own ingroup with greater empathy, respect, and cooperation. In 
experimental studies, people distribute more resources to ingroup 
51 Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common 
Ingroup Identity Model 36 (2000). 
52 Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup 
Hate?, 55 J. Soc. Issues 429, 430 (1999). Researchers have demonstrated that while 
ingroup and outgroup biases are the converse of each other, ingroup bias may exist 
even in the absence of negative attitudes toward outgroups. Id. at 432. 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
54 See Mackie et al., supra note 35, at 46 (citing examples from a number of studies); 
Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, supra note 44, at 368–69 (citing 
studies).  
55 See Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions During Social 
Interactions: Attenuating the Impact of Negative Expectancies, 56 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 374, 375 (1989); see also Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hy-
pothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
1202 (1978) (describing a study showing how people use social interactions to confirm 
their hypotheses about other people and how those social interactions also serve to 
bring about the expected behaviors). 
56 Neuberg, Expectancy-Confirmation Processes in Stereotype-Tinged Social En-
counters: The Moderating Role of Social Goals, supra note 45, at 106. 
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members, and they evaluate them more positively.57 They also are 
inclined to be more generous in their explanations for the behavior 
of ingroup members than they are towards others. For example, 
people tend to attribute an achievement of someone in their own 
group to the person’s abilities or dispositions, while they attribute 
an achievement by others to luck or some other external factor.58 
Conversely, although to a somewhat lesser extent, they view nega-
tive behaviors and outcomes as flukes or exceptions when exhib-
ited by ingroup members, and as internal, stable characteristics 
when evidenced in outgroup members.59 People also tend to judge 
behaviors as more negative and intentional when performed by 
someone outside their group; an action that is perceived as a sim-
ple push by a member of one’s own group may be perceived as an 
act of aggression when performed by someone else.60 
Some researchers hypothesize that people favor members of 
their own ingroups as part of a larger preference for the familiar, 
which is more comfortable, less challenging, and less threatening 
than the unfamiliar.61 This hypothesis is consistent with Krieger’s 
57 See research collected in Gaertner & Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The 
Common Ingroup Identity Model, supra note 51, at 38–39. 
58 See Kay Deaux & Marianne LaFrance, Gender, in 1 The Handbook of Social Psy-
chology 788, 798 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (women’s success at tradi-
tionally male tasks tends to be attributed to effort, whereas men’s comparable success 
is attributed to ability). This phenomenon has been labeled the “ultimate attribute 
error.” See Miles Hewstone, The “Ultimate Attribution Error”: A Review of the Lit-
erature on Intergroup Attributions, 20 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 311 (1990) (reviewing 
nineteen studies documenting attribution errors, especially in the context of racial 
groups); Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s 
Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 461, 464–65 
(1979) (defining phenomenon). 
59 See Hewstone, The “Ultimate Attribution Error”: A Review of the Literature on 
Intergroup Attributions, supra note 58. 
60 Negative action by an out-group member is also perceived at a more abstract and 
stable level (“she is hostile”) than identical behavior of the ingroup member (“she 
slapped the girl”), while the reverse is true about positive behaviors (“she walked 
across the street holding the man’s hand” versus “she is helpful”). See Gaertner & 
Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model, supra 
note 51, at 39; Hewstone, The “Ultimate Attribution Error”: A Review of the Litera-
ture on Intergroup Attributions, supra note 58; Anne Maass et al., Linguistic Inter-
group Bias: Evidence for In-Group-Protective Motivation, 71 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 512 (1996). 
61 See Marilyn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, Intergroup Relations, in 2 The Hand-
book of Social Psychology 554 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds. 1998); Anthony G. 
Greenwald et al., Implicit Partisanship: Taking Sides for No Reason, 83 J. Personality 
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treatment of ingroup bias primarily as a cognitive phenomenon, 
rather than a motivated one.62 The familiarity explanation, how-
ever, fails to take account of research showing that people align 
themselves with people in their groups once they become aware of 
their commonality, even if they do not actually know members of 
the group or share meaningful experiences with them. Ingroup fa-
voritism occurs in experimental settings when group designation is 
arbitrary, random, or meaningless.63 Indeed, simply knowing that 
there are people outside the group can be enough to spur inter-
group bias and rivalry—again, even when there is no contact with 
or knowledge of the others.64 Based on these findings, most re-
searchers have concluded that familiarity itself does not explain in-
group bias in these “minimal group” settings.65 
& Soc. Psychol. 367, 369 (2002). “Homophily,” or the attraction of people toward 
others like themselves, has been explained under relational demography theory as an 
“uncertainty reduction mechanism that facilitates individuals’ decisions regarding 
group membership and their formations of personal identities.” See Christine M. 
Riordan et al., Relational Demography Within Groups: Through the Lens of Dis-
crimination, in Discrimination at Work: The Psychological and Organizational Bases 
37, 39 (Robert L. Dipboye & Adrienne Colella eds., 2005). 
62 Krieger, supra note 7, at 1191–93. 
63 Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et al., Implicit Associations as the Seeds of Intergroup 
Bias: How Easily Do They Take Root?, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 789, 793 
(2001) (finding ingroup bias even when groups are formed by whether their assigned 
name has an “X” or a “Q” in it); Henri Tajfel et al., Social Categorization and Inter-
group Behavior, 1 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 149, 154–55 (1971) (finding that people exhibit 
ingroup favoritism even when groups formed according to whether people overesti-
mate or underestimate the sizes of dots); see also Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Auto-
matic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. 
Exper. Soc. Psychol. 316 (2000) (reviewing study about the preference for familiar 
names). Anthony Greenwald puts ingroup favoritism in the context of a larger phe-
nomenon whereby people are invited to “take sides,” even when the side they take is 
as arbitrary as home town, or which team is currently winning, or losing, a game. See 
Greenwald et al., supra note 61, at 367 (describing a “natural proclivity for partisan-
ship”). 
64 This was demonstrated dramatically in the Robbers Cave experiments by Muzafer 
Sherif et al., Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment 
(1961). 
 For an account in the social norms literature of how groups both use intra-group 
status rewards as a non-material means of gaining material sacrifice from members 
and how this dynamic leads to conflict between groups (and helps to explain racial 
discrimination), see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics 
of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1007–
08 (1995). 
65 See, e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al., supra note 63, at 795. 
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The fuller explanation for ingroup bias is that it serves people’s 
psychological needs—in particular, the need to think well of them-
selves. According to social identity theory, people attribute posi-
tive characteristics to groups of which they are members in order to 
maintain a positive self-identity and thus heighten self-esteem.66 
The link between ingroup bias and self-esteem is supported by re-
search demonstrating that threatening circumstances increase in-
group favoritism and outgroup disparagement, as people seek to 
shore up their sense of well-being and worth. Threats of all varie-
ties have been associated with intolerance, especially threats to 
self-esteem.67 In one set of studies, student test subjects showed an 
elevation in race stereotyping after receiving negative feedback 
from a black manager.68 The effect was observed only when the 
student was on the receiving end of the feedback; merely witness-
ing negative feedback being given to another did not increase 
stereotyping.69 Other research supports the conclusion that this 
type of response is not simply a generalized reaction to negative 
feedback, but a specific phenomenon related to stereotyping. In 
66 See Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Be-
havior Relation, in Psychology of Intergroup Relations 7, 16 (Stephen Worchel & 
William G. Austin eds., 1986). For a description of similar theories to explain ingroup 
bias in relation to self-esteem and group identity, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., A 
Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem, and Self-Concept, 109 
Psychol. Rev. 3, 9–10 (2002). See also John C. Turner & Rina S. Onorato, Social Iden-
tity, Personality, and the Self-Concept: A Self-Categorization Perspective, in The Psy-
chology of the Social Self 11 (Tom Tyler et al. eds., 1999). 
67 See Crocker et al., supra note 5, at 508 (threats to people’s self-esteem increases 
ingroup favoritism); Stanley Feldman & Karen Stenner, Perceived Threat and Au-
thoritarianism, 18 Pol. Psychol. 741, 762 (1997) (threats are associated with intoler-
ance, especially among those with authoritarian attitudes); David A. Wilder & Peter 
N. Shapiro, The Role of Competition-Induced Anxiety in Limiting the Beneficial Im-
pact of Positive Behavior by an Out-Group Member, 57 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
60, 67 (1989) (anxiety increases stereotyping of outgroup members, and reduced anxi-
ety increases positive views of outgroup members). 
68 Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional: Motivated Inhibi-
tion and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 885, 
887–94 (1999). Conversely, positive feedback from the same black manager reduced 
black stereotypes. Id. In follow-up studies, positive feedback from a black doctor ap-
peared to trigger doctor stereotypes, whereas negative feedback triggered negative 
black stereotypes. Id. at 987–98; see also Spencer et al., Automatic Activation of 
Stereotypes: The Role of Self-Image Threat, 24 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1139 
(1998) (finding that negative feedback by Asian Americans increased activation of 
Asian-American stereotypes). 
69 Sinclair & Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional, supra note 68, at 901–02. 
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one study, for example, students rated women instructors from 
whom they had gotten low grades as less competent to a substan-
tially greater extent than male instructors from whom they had got-
ten low grades.70 Consistent with the black manager feedback stud-
ies, students receiving high grades did not view their women 
instructors as any less competent than their male instructors. 71 
Negative feedback may trigger stereotypes even when it is not 
connected to the source of the feedback. In one experiment, (bo-
gus) negative computer feedback on an intelligence test appeared 
to trigger stereotypes about gays and Jews, unrelated to the feed-
back or its source, that were not triggered when the feedback was 
positive.72 
The negative stereotyping produced in these types of experi-
ments is typically inconsistent with what people report about their 
more egalitarian attitudes and beliefs about members of other 
groups. In an effort to explain the discrepancy, researchers have 
identified phenomena they label “aversive” racism73 and “aversive” 
or “ambivalent” sexism.74 Aversive racists think of themselves as 
egalitarian. They report their own views as egalitarian, sympathize 
with blacks, and are cautious about expressing negative evalua-
tions. In situations in which they can do so without conscious 
awareness or exposing their true attitudes to others, however, they 
engage in stereotyping, reflect negative attitudes about racial mi-
norities, and exhibit anxiety about interracial interaction.75 Am-
70 Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Motivated Stereotyping of Women: She’s Fine if She 
Praised Me But Incompetent if She Criticized Me, 26 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
Bull. 1329, 1332–33 (2000). 
71 Id. The findings of the study were replicated in a follow-up study of feedback by 
manager in a simulated work setting. Id. at 1334–37. Again, the effect of negative 
feedback on manager evaluation was not observed when the study subject merely ob-
served the manager giving negative feedback to others. Id. at 1338–40. 
72 Steven Fein & Steven J. Spencer, Prejudice as Self-Image Maintenance: Affirming 
the Self Through Derogating Others, 73 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 31, 32–37 
(1997). 
73 The term “aversive racism” was first coined by Joel Kovel, see Kovel, supra note 
23, at 54–55 (1970). It was revised and popularized principally through the work of 
John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. 
Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 Psychol. Sci. 
315 (2000); Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism, supra note 23. 
74 Crisp & Turner, supra note 23, at 166–68; Glick & Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism 
Inventory, supra note 23, at 491. 
75 See Gaertner et al., Aversive Racism, supra note 23, at 377–85. 
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bivalent sexism works somewhat differently. Ambivalent sexists 
hold a mixture of negative and positive views toward women. For 
example, the belief that women are less competent than men at 
work, weaker, and less rational, but also that they are also warmer, 
more sensitive to the needs of others, and better at forming rela-
tionships. The positive or benevolent views appear to satisfy peo-
ple’s need to think of themselves as egalitarian, while at the same 
time helping them to rationalize or obscure their more negative or 
patronizing views.76 
The first experiments documenting the existence of aversive ra-
cism suggested that whites were less likely to give help to blacks 
than to other whites, unless circumstances made clear to the white 
test subjects that they were the only ones available to help. The 
apparent explanation was that whites harbored negative attitudes 
toward blacks that they were able to suppress when failing to do so 
would reveal those attitudes to themselves.77  
One set of studies from the early 1970s tested the responses of 
people to a phone call from a motorist who claimed to have broken 
down on the highway and, having used his last change trying to 
phone a service station and getting a “wrong number” instead, re-
quested that the person on the other end of the line call the service 
station for him. Whites were less likely to help black callers (identi-
fiable, researchers noted, by their dialects) than other whites. In 
other findings, people presumed by their party affiliation to be lib-
eral treated black and white callers more equally than people pre-
sumed to be conservatives (in large part because conservatives 
helped whites more than liberals did). Liberals also expressed 
more egalitarian views. Liberals, however, also tended to try 
harder than conservatives to avoid learning information that might 
make clear that their help was needed—that is, they hung up the 
telephone earlier and more often.78 This finding suggested to re-
76 Glick & Fiske, supra note 23, at 494, 508. Researchers have noted that negative 
attitudes toward women have always been more ambivalent than negative racial atti-
tudes, because of the “subjectively positive feelings toward women that often go hand 
in hand with sexist antipathy.” Id. at 491. 
77 These experiments are summarized in Gaertner et al., supra note 23, at 381–83. 
78 See Samuel L. Gaertner, Helping Behavior and Racial Discrimination Among 
Liberals and Conservatives, 25 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 335 (1973). In this 
“wrong-number” study, each caller tried to explain that his or her car was broken 
down and that he or she was trying to reach a service station from a parkway tele-
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searchers that people with views that are more consciously egalitar-
ian nonetheless manifest negative attitudes or anxieties in subtle 
ways, and find strategies to obscure these attitudes from them-
selves and others.79 
Subsequent studies, while documenting a decline in overall self-
reported expressions of prejudice, have confirmed the ambivalence 
phenomenon. One 1999 study involves the evaluations of employ-
ment applications. In the study, test subjects evaluated blacks with 
strong applications somewhat more highly than similarly-qualified 
whites (recommending the black candidate 87 percent of the time, 
compared to 79 percent for the white candidate), and they evalu-
ated blacks with weak applications somewhat less negatively (rec-
ommending the black candidate 15 percent of the time, as com-
pared to 8 percent for the white candidate). These same people, 
however, evaluated blacks with mixed qualifications—that is, 
strong on one criterion and weak on another—more negatively 
than similarly qualified whites (recommending the black candidate 
40 percent of the time, as compared to 77 percent for the white 
candidate).80 
Similar results were obtained in studies in which test subjects 
were asked to review college applications. As in the employment 
application studies, test subjects did not discriminate against black 
applicants when the credentials were consistently strong or weak. 
They rated applications from blacks more negatively than compa-
rable applications from white candidates, however, when the cre-
dentials were mixed. In these closer, more ambiguous circum-
stances, test subjects would adjust the weights given to various 
criteria in order to justify their judgments in particular case. Thus, 
when reviewers justified a negative decision, they gave greater 
weight to grades when the grades were weaker, and greater weight 
phone, but now, as a result of apparently dialing a wrong number, was out of change, 
and needed the person on the other end of the line to telephone the garage. Id. 
79 This view is consistent with more recent research in the gender context concluding 
that more negative treatment of women is apparent in low-conflict, low-visibility 
situations, where it is harder to characterize as discriminatory, and easier to rational-
ize. See Bongsoon Cho & Debra L. Connelley, The Effect of Conflict and Power Dif-
ferentials on Social Identity and Intergroup Discrimination 15–17 (unpublished 
manuscript, available at http:ssrn.com/abstract=320286).  
80 See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, supra note 23, 
at 317. 
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to college board scores or the number of AP classes when the dis-
favored candidate was weaker according to these criteria.81 Re-
searchers have identified a similar phenomenon in the gender con-
text. In one experimental study, men were favored over women by 
study participants evaluating resumes for a construction job, with 
education or experience rated as the more important criterion de-
pending upon the gender and credentials of the candidate.82 
Research attempting to determine when women and minorities 
benefit from a leniency bias and when they are judged more criti-
cally suggests that leniency bias is more common in non-zero-sum 
circumstances—that is, when it matters least. People give more 
praise to a woman than a man for a base hit in softball,83 and 
stronger feedback to a black employee for a memo than they 
would give to a memo of the same quality written by a white em-
ployee.84 Researchers believe that this favoritism, when it occurs, is 
motivated by a desire not to appear biased, as well as a generalized 
sense of awkwardness or ambivalence in interacting with minorities 
and women.85 Overcorrection or benevolence represents a form of 
“giving credit where credit is due,” or sympathy, affirming people’s 
81 See Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination: Differential 
Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 460, 469–
70 (2002). 
82 See Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J. Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. 817, 820–21 (2004). It appears that the qualifications of favored can-
didates were not only weighted in order to justify the end result, but information was 
also viewed initially and remembered so as to support the favoritism, even before 
evaluators knew they would be asked to make a selection. Id. at 824–25. 
83 Monica Biernat, Toward a Broader View of Social Stereotyping, 58 Am. Psy-
chologist 1019, 1019 (2003). 
84 Id. at 1021. According to Biernat, this is more likely when subjective standards are 
used, and when non-zero-sum judgments are being made. Id. at 1024–25; see also Lee 
Jussim et al., The Nature of Stereotypes: A Comparison and Integration of Three 
Theories, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 536, 541–42 (1987) (finding that in an ex-
perimental setting, blacks who spoke in Standard English and dressed like members 
of a high socio-economic class were evaluated more favorably in mock-hiring context 
than similar whites). 
85 See Kent D. Harber, Feedback to Minorities: Evidence of a Positive Bias, 74 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 622, 626–27 (1998). This motivation may even elicit more 
positive feedback to blacks who act in an unfriendly way. See Kent D. Harber, The 
Positive Feedback Bias as a Response to Out-Group Unfriendliness, 34 J. Applied 
Soc. Psychol. 2272 (2004). 
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sense of themselves as unprejudiced.86 When, however, employers 
choose among people for a single available position—that is, when 
it matters most—judgments tend to revert to stereotype. The 
woman who receives high praise for the base hit is not necessarily 
chosen next time for the team, and while women and minorities 
may get higher performance reviews and even make the “short 
list” for promotions, they are less likely to get them than their 
white male counterparts.87 
These complexities pose a difficult challenge for employment 
discrimination law. The studies predict that implicit discrimination 
will occur in evaluation contexts, but they cannot tell in individual 
instances when it will occur, or what form it will take. The research 
also suggests that people can identify strongly with egalitarian val-
ues, and yet unconsciously hold prejudiced attitudes that influence 
their evaluative decisions. These attitudes appear to be, at least in 
part, motivated by people’s needs to feel good about themselves. 
These findings raise significant questions about the optimal role for 
law in reducing discrimination. Before addressing these questions, 
Part II describes how Title VII currently addresses implicit bias, 
and how some scholars propose to reform the law to make it more 
effective. 
II. TITLE VII AND IMPLICIT BIAS 
A. Title VII Requires Causation, Not Deliberate Intent 
Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination “because of” race, 
sex, and other protected characteristics.88 Consistent with this lan-
guage, both supporters and opponents of Title VII understood 
from the beginning that the Act was intended to address subtle, as 
86 See John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along? Interpersonal Biases 
and Interracial Distruct, 8 Cultural Diversity & Ethnic Minority Psychol. 99, 92, 98–99 
(2002). For the observation that overcompensation of candidates appears to represent 
the recognition of bias, but a naïve form thereof, see Christopher L. Aberson & Tara 
E. Ettlin, The Aversive Racism Paradigm and Responses Favoring African-
Americans: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Two Types of Favoritism, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 
25, 40–41 (Mar. 2004). 
87 See Biernat, supra note 83, at 1024–25; Nina Gupta et al., Employee Gender, 
Gender Similarity, and Supervisor-Subordinate Cross-Evaluations, 8 Psychol. Women 
Q. 174, 179 (1983). 
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
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well as overt, forms of discrimination.89 To this end, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has developed a proof structure enabling plaintiffs to 
establish the necessary causal link between an employer decision 
and race, sex, or other prohibited characteristic, even in the ab-
sence of explicit discriminatory intent. Under a line of cases begin-
ning with McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,90 once a plaintiff 
proves a prima facie case,91 the defendant bears the burden of pro-
ducing a non-discriminatory explanation for a negative employ-
ment decision. Defendant’s production shifts the burden back to 
the plaintiff, who has the opportunity to show that the employer’s 
reason was a pretext. If this burden is met, the factfinder is permit-
ted to infer that the employer based its decision on an illegal rea-
son, although it is not required to do so.92 While throughout this 
burden shifting courts often speak of discriminatory motive and in-
tention, they also identify as the ultimate objective the determina-
tion of whether the employment action was because of a prohibited 
factor.93 
89 See Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presump-
tion in Title VII and the Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1177, 
1195–1209 (2003) (examining legislative history). 
90 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
248 (1981) (explaining further the burden of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green).  
91 A prima facie case is established when plaintiff proves that he or she is a member 
of a class protected by Title VII, and failed to obtain an employment opportunity for 
which she was qualified, or was subjected to an employment action to which others 
were not subject. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248. 
92 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). 
93 See, e.g., id. at 141 (“intentional” used to mean whether the “protected 
trait . . . actually motivated the employer’s decision” (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1998))); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–11 
(1993) (referring interchangeably to the plaintiff’s need to prove intentional discrimi-
nation, and to prove that race was the “true reason” for the employment decision); 
see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 294 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) (the “ultimate question” is “whether discrimination caused the plaintiff’s harm”). 
For an analysis of the difference between acting in fact on the basis of race or gender, 
and intending to do so, see Deborah Hellman, When Is Discrimination Wrong?, 138–
68 (2008). 
 For a more comprehensive argument that Title VII already prohibits unconscious, 
as well as conscious, bias, see Banks & Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?, 
supra note 14, at 1072–89. See also Wax, Discrimination as Accident, supra note 12. 
For fuller treatment of the confusion over the concept of intent, see Wax, The Dis-
criminating Mind, supra note 12, at 982–83. 
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Many employment discrimination scholars claim that courts 
have read an intent requirement into Title VII and urge the elimi-
nation of this requirement.94 This contention has some support in 
the cases, but the point is often exaggerated. While courts fre-
quently use language of discriminatory intent and motive in dispa-
rate treatment cases, typically they do so in order to distinguish 
discrimination based on a prohibited factor from employment ac-
tion taken for non-discriminatory reasons, such as a violation of 
company rules or a lack of qualifications. In this context, the lan-
guage of intention means that a causal link must be found between 
an employment action and the plaintiff’s race, sex, or other pro-
tected characteristic—not that a deliberately or consciously dis-
criminatory purpose is required.95 Courts also use the language of 
intentional discrimination to distinguish disparate treatment cases 
from cases of disparate impact.96 The 1991 Amendments to Title 
94 See, e.g., Lu-in Wang, Discrimination by Default: How Racism Becomes Routine 
19–23 (2006); Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On 
Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 747, 752 (2001); Tristin K. 
Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Employer 
Wrong, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 895–900 (2007); Krieger, supra note 7, at 1164, 1168–73; 
McGinley, supra note 17, at 417–18; Robert L. Nelson et al., Divergent Paths: Con-
flicting Conceptions of Employment Discrimination in Law and the Social Sciences, 4 
Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 103, 107 (2008); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899–900 (1993); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual 
Segregation, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1102 (2008); see also Christine Jolls & Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 969, 980 (2006) (identifying that 
the “central focus” of existing antidiscrimination law is to prohibit “consciously biased 
decisionmaking”); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved 
With Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 1141, 1143–44 (2007) (criticizing courts for importing intent require-
ments into disparate impact cases). 
95 See supra note 93. Thus, for example, an employer’s decision not to promote a 
woman because of the employer’s assumption that she would not want to relocate be-
cause of family obligations might be based on the employer’s concern for the em-
ployee, but it still constitutes sex-based discrimination. Cf. Lust v. Sealy, 383 F.3d 580, 
583 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming trial verdict in favor of plaintiff after the supervisor ad-
mitted that he didn’t consider recommending the plaintiff for promotion because she 
had children). See also Back v. Hastings, 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (reversing sum-
mary judgment against school district that that denied tenure to a school psychologist 
on the assumption that, as a young mother, she would not be able to devote herself to 
the job). 
96 See, e.g., Int’l Bhd. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (dis-
parate treatment under Title VII, to which “discriminatory motive is critical,” means 
“the employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” as contrasted with disparate impact, 
BARTLETT_BOOK 11/18/2009  6:10 PM 
2009] Making Good on Good Intentions 1923 
 
VII explicitly use the term “intentional discrimination” in this 
way,97 rather than to signify an intent requirement that goes beyond 
the need to show causation.98 Accordingly, in interpreting the 
Amendments, the Supreme Court has included circumstances such 
as the employer not understanding that certain conduct was unlaw-
ful within the rubric “intentional” and thus sufficient to support a 
claim for compensatory damages, while requiring that “malice,” 
“reckless indifference,” or “evil intent” be shown in order to sup-
port an award for punitive damages. 
Some scholars point to the “honest belief” rule as evidence that 
courts require conscious intent to prove a discrimination case.99 
Here, again, the claim is overstated. Some courts have exonerated 
defendants who honestly believed that they had a nondiscrimina-
tory reason for an employment action, such as that an employee 
was stealing from the company.100 Generally, however, the rele-
vance of evidence of honest belief is not that it disproves discrimi-
nation itself, but that it may undermine a showing  of pretext.101 As 
which involves employer practices that are facially neutral but fall more harshly on 
one group than another). Disparate impact discrimination was first identified by the 
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971). It was codi-
fied as part of Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) 
(2006). 
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (2006). This section provides for an award of compen-
satory and punitive damages against a “respondent who engaged in unlawful inten-
tional discrimination” which is then explained in parentheses immediately thereafter: 
“(not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact).” 
98 Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, 535–37 (1999).  
99 See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 
997, 1029–38 (2006) (criticizing the “honest belief” rule). Of similar, claimed effect is 
the “same actor” inference, which permits a factfinder to conclude that the supervisor 
who hired the plaintiff did not later discriminate on the basis of a characteristic that 
would have been evident at the time of hiring.  See Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for 
Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the Contemporary 
Workplace, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1117, 1124–38 (2008) (criticizing the “same actor” rule); 
Julie S. Northup, The “Same Actor Inference” in Employment Discrimination Cases: 
Cheap Justice?, 73 Wash. L. Rev. 193 (1998) (same). 
100 See, e.g., Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 417–18 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that whether employer discriminated is determined by his honest reason for 
taking the action). 
101 Examples of the application of the honest belief rule that are criticized for their 
insistence upon a conscious intent requirement but which are consistent with this 
analysis include Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 762 (8th Cir. 2005); Millbrook 
v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002), and Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 
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Richard Ford points out, if the rule sometimes produces wrong re-
sults in the jurisdictions in which it is applied, it is less because of 
judicial misunderstandings about a legal requirement of conscious 
intent than because of their overly simplistic notions of causation.102 
When Title VII is read properly, a plaintiff should be able to show 
that an employer discriminated against her unknowingly, notwith-
standing the employer’s absence of deceit.103 
The fact that a showing of conscious intent is not required of 
plaintiffs under Title VII is apparent from the wide range of fact 
situations in which discrimination has been found under Title VII 
without a showing of hostility or intentionality. For example, dis-
paraging remarks or stereotypes based on race or sex, procedural 
irregularities, or excessive reliance on subjective job criteria104 all 
have sufficed to establish unlawful discrimination in disparate 
treatment cases, even in the absence of deliberate or conscious dis-
criminatory intent. Findings of discrimination based on such evi-
dence demonstrate that, while sometimes discriminatory animus is 
the best way to establish the link between an employment action 
and a characteristic protected by Title VII (or “intent”), it is not 
the only way, or even the most common.105 
The development of the mixed-motives doctrine also demon-
strates that courts understand the discrimination prohibited by Ti-
F.3d 274, 279–80 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 875 (2000). For application of 
the same actor rule, see Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 798 (4th Cir. 1991), and cases 
cited in Martin, supra, note 99. 
102 Cf. Banks & Ford, supra note 14, at 1087 (honest belief rule “does not make li-
ability contingent on whether defendant consciously believed it discriminated [but] on 
whether the plaintiff can show that the defendant’s proffered rationale was a pre-
text”). 
103 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674–75 (2009) (employer’s good-faith 
belief that its race-based actions were necessary to avoid disparate impact liability is 
not enough to justify taking adverse action “because of . . . race”).  
104 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989) (sex stereo-
types); Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard, 305 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2002) (procedural 
irregularities); McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(hiring persons with lower job qualifications than the plaintiff); Simms v. Oklahoma, 
165 F.3d 1321, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999) (subjective standards); Thomas v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999) (subjective employment practices); see also 
EEOC v. Inland Marine Indust., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that 
racial discrimination “sometimes wears a benign mask”). 
105 See Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences Proving Discrimination, 79 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 1243, 1243 (2008). 
BARTLETT_BOOK 11/18/2009  6:10 PM 
2009] Making Good on Good Intentions 1925 
 
tle VII to be a complex phenomenon, and not always the result of a 
conscious or single-minded effort to treat racial minorities or 
women worse than others. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,106 evi-
dence that sex stereotypes about the plaintiff entered into the deci-
sion to deny her promotion to firm partnership was mixed with ar-
guably sex-neutral evaluations of her harsh personality and 
difficulty in getting along with others. There was no evidence of a 
deliberate decision by the company partners to discriminate 
against her because of her sex. Nevertheless, the Court recognized 
that discrimination prohibited by Title VII can be the result of a 
mixture of motives, none of them necessarily intentional in the 
sense of deliberate or conscious. Members of the Court split over 
whether plaintiffs should have to prove that sex was a “but-for” 
cause of the action,107 a “substantial factor,”108 or a “motivating 
part,”109 but all Justices appeared to agree that decisionmaking 
based on gender stereotypes violates Title VII, whether or not the 
wrongdoer is aware of the stereotypes or intends to engage in 
them.110 When Congress strengthened the mixed-motives standard 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, its choice of the “motivating factor” 
standard carried forward the Price Waterhouse meaning of the 
term “motive” as causation, not conscious or deliberate intent.111 In 
later holding that mixed-motive cases could be shown by circum-
stantial as well as direct evidence,112 the Court made still clearer 
that there are many ways to prove that discrimination has oc-
106 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
107 Id. at 295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
108 Id. at 276–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
109 Id. at 250 (plurality opinion). 
110 Thus, even the dissenting opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, while incorporating the language of discrimina-
tory intent, states that the “ultimate question . . . is whether discrimination caused the 
plaintiff’s harm.” Id. at 294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 295.  
111 The Court in Price Waterhouse held that the employer was not liable if it could 
show that it would have reached the “same decision” on the basis of nondiscrimina-
tory factors. Id. at 242. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 changed the same-decision rule, 
providing that liability is established under Title VII if any prohibited factor moti-
vated the decision, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006), but limiting damages in cases in 
which the employer shows that its decision was justified on the basis of a nondiscrimi-
natory factor. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
112 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003). 
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curred, and that there is no set formula requiring deliberate in-
tent.113 
These cases affirm that Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination 
“because of” a plaintiff’s race, sex, or other protected characteristic 
covers unconscious as well as conscious discrimination. In addition, 
courts’ understanding of what discrimination means have encom-
passed increasingly more subtle forms of discrimination, proved by 
more indirect forms of proof. When the Supreme Court has re-
neged on the promise of Title VII in this regard,114 it often has self-
corrected,115 or Congress has intervened to repair the damage.116 As 
discussed later in the Article,117 further clarification that Title VII 
prohibits discrimination, not malicious intent, would correct some 
misunderstandings about how Title VII should be applied. It 
should be understood, however, that these reforms will not turn Ti-
tle VII from a statute that fails to recognize unconscious bias to 
one that does, and thus are unlikely to have the hoped-for, major 
impact in reducing implicit discrimination. 
B. Proposed Reforms 
In addition to advocating movement away from the supposed in-
tent requirement of Title VII, employment discrimination scholars 
have proposed various reforms that, in small and large ways, re-
113 Id. (“Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, 
satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence” (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. 
Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n. 17 (1957)) (citation omitted)). 
114 See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 518–19, 523–24 (1993) 
(holding that proof of pretext requires more than discrediting defendant’s “nondis-
criminatory” reason); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1989) 
(weakening business necessity standard in disparate impact cases, and shifting burden 
of persuasion on the issue to plaintiff); see also Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262–63, 
276, 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that in mixed motives case, plaintiff 
must prove that sex was the “but for” cause, using direct evidence). 
115 See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 92 (holding that direct evidence is not 
required in mixed motives case); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 
133, 147–49 (2000) (clarifying Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, to make clear that the factfinder is 
entitled to find for the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff’s discrediting of the defen-
dant’s nondiscriminatory reason). 
116 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (codifying Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), after the Supreme Court had cut back on the decision in 
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (establishing that plaintiff 
can make out mixed motives case by showing that sex was a “motivating factor”). 
117 See infra Section V.A. 
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spond to the difficulty of proving implicit discrimination. These 
proposals have in common a general sense that implicit discrimina-
tion is too hard to prove under current law and thus that this law 
should be deliberately recalibrated to bring about more positive re-
sults for plaintiffs. They also share an assessment that, given the 
difficulties of proof, the risk of false negatives outweighs the risk of 
false positives.118 
Some of the proposals would alter the proof structure of Title 
VII and the burden of proof each party must carry. Ann McGinley, 
for example, argues in favor of a mandatory presumption of dis-
crimination after the plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine and then demonstrates 
that the reason the defendant gives for its employment decision is 
inaccurate or untrue (that is, a “pretext”).119 Current law permits an 
inference of discrimination based on pretext, on the assumption 
that pretext may mean that the employer was lying in order to 
cover up a discriminatory action, but it does not require that con-
clusion120 The approach of current law recognizes, for example, that 
an employer who uses the recession as an excuse to let go some of 
its less productive employees might have tried to obscure the real 
cause of an employment action, but has not necessarily engaged in 
race or gender discrimination. The employee may have wished to 
avoid having to prove the performance problems, or the company 
may have desired to avoid unrelated, damaging public disclosure of 
the real motive, such as embezzlement, falling profits, or a sexual 
assault by the plaintiff of an innocent employee. The proposed pre-
sumption would not allow these alternatives to be considered.121 
Another proposal would create a new liability category. Russell 
Robinson advocates the imposition of liability under Title VII 
when the discrimination is clear to those with backgrounds and ex-
periences similar to those of the plaintiff, even though it is not clear 
to others. Robinson’s proposal is grounded in a theory of percep-
118 See McGinley,  supra note 17, at 482  (“[T]he opportunities for underestimating  
the incidence of discriminatory behavior are much greater than the reverse.”). 
119 Id. at 481–82. 
120 Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147–49; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 518–19, 523–24. 
121 For other examples of proposals designed to alter the proof structure to make it 
easier to prove implicit discrimination, see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of 
Psychological Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in 
Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 83, 108, 120–27 (2008). 
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tual differences between insiders and outsiders, and the unfairness 
of limiting Title VII liability to circumstances recognizable by those 
whose insider perspective blinds them to many of the kind of dis-
crimination outsiders experience.122 He would impose the new form 
of intermediate liability when “a reasonable outsider would find 
the claim compelling, although an insider judge might not.”123 In 
such cases, plaintiffs could recover some, but not all, of the relief 
that they would obtain in a case in which they were able to prove 
discrimination that both insiders and outsiders would recognize.124 
Other commentators have proposed measures that would ex-
pand employer responsibility to correct whatever workplace pro-
cedures and structures might fail to block discriminatory decision-
making. For example, David Oppenheimer suggests that Title VII 
should include a tort-like duty on the part of the employer to take 
all reasonable, affirmative precautions against discrimination.125 
While under current Title VII law employer practices and proce-
dures that have a disparate impact on women or minorities are sub-
ject to challenge,126 under Oppenheimer’s proposal, every rejection 
of a woman or minority job applicant would trigger a duty to stop 
and examine the motives of the decisionmaking instantly. In addi-
tion, Oppenheimer would impose liability on employers for failing 
to scrutinize job screening procedures, employee evaluations, and 
employee disciplinary actions to ensure they do not allow discrimi-
nation to improperly influence decisionmaking.127 This approach, in 
essence, would mandate a uniform, albeit shifting, set of diversity 
“best practices” for every employer subject to Title VII. 
Tristin Green, too, would hold employers responsible for cor-
recting a broad range of “structural features” of the workplace that 
122 Robinson sees this focus on perceptual differences between insiders and outsiders 
as an important and overlooked part of the implicit bias problem. See Russell K. Rob-
inson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1103 (2008) (noting that im-
plicit bias scholarship is about the psychology of privileged groups or insiders, which 
speaks to only part of the story of implicit bias). 
123 Id. at 1167. 
124 Id. at 1169 (plaintiff might receive “some form of relief, such as attorneys’ fees or 
a portion of the damages that a prevailing plaintiff would normally recover”). 
125 See Oppenheimer, supra note 94, at 899 (1993). 
126 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–31 (1971). 
127 Oppenheimer, supra note 94, at 970. 
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might permit unconscious bias to occur.128 Under Green’s proposal, 
the failure to achieve demographic balance in work team assign-
ments that might reduce bias could constitute a Title VII violation, 
as could the failure to reduce the salience of ingroup-outgroup dis-
tinctions, communication systems that do not achieve optimal in-
formation flow that could increase inclusiveness, and chains of 
command that reproduce race and gender hierarchies.129 Employers 
would be expected to know how implicit bias operates, and to “re-
frain from creating work environments that facilitate the operation 
of those biases in workplace decisionmaking.”130 This responsibility 
would extend to anticipating, and taking steps to avoid, the re-
sponses that victims sometimes make to discrimination that further 
disadvantages them.131 
These kinds of proposals represent understandable frustrations 
with a legal system that has not yet been able to get an effective 
grip on implicit discrimination. They assume that expanding liabil-
ity standards and procedural rules making discrimination easier to 
prove will incentivize employers to be more careful about the deci-
128 See, e.g., Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locat-
ing Employer Wrong, supra note 18; see also Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, 
Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 Hastings L.J. 1435, 
1457 (2008) (suggesting that the law should require employers to “address relational 
sources of discrimination” and eliminate “extreme rigidity and segregation in job 
categories”). 
129 Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Em-
ployer Wrong, supra note 18, at 856–57. 
130 Id. at 899. Susan Sturm has also argued in favor of structural workplace reform. 
By and large, however, Sturm focuses not on enhanced liability rules for individual 
plaintiffs but on other kinds of workplace accountability and institutional change. See 
supra note 13. 
131 Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating Em-
ployer Wrong, supra note 18, at 900–03. Green uses the term “accommodation man-
date” to refer to employer responsibilities that stem from the obligation to anticipate 
the response of women and members of minority groups to existing workplace struc-
tures and to alter those structures to accommodate—and possibly interrupt—the cycle 
of bias. Id. at 902. The examples she gives of responsive behavior which the employer 
should anticipate are members of minority groups undertaking “extra identity work” 
to persuade others that they do not have the stereotyped characteristics attributed to 
them, and the lack of female interest in certain jobs which is the result of employer 
policies that have depressed that interest. Id. at 900–02; see also Tristin K. Green, 
Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 
86 N.C. L. Rev. 379, 379–80 (2008) (arguing that employers should be required to 
permit people of color and women to “signal” group identification by accommodating 
their dress and appearance needs). 
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sions they make. The fact that law has not been entirely effective in 
ridding the workplace of discrimination, however, does not mean 
that these wider and deeper legal nets would do any better. Spe-
cifically, proposals to short-circuit basic issues of proof and causa-
tion and second-guess a wide range of employer decisions ignore 
the potential negative effects of law on the very discrimination they 
seek to reduce. While these reforms may close off some opportuni-
ties for discrimination, they also risk undermining the conditions 
necessary to motivate people to want to avoid implicit discrimina-
tion. They may, in fact, feed rather than reduce implicit discrimina-
tion. 
To demonstrate how this might be the case, Part III examines 
the principles of motivation and how they relate to whether people 
respond to others in nondiscriminatory ways. It examines the bene-
fits of people internalizing the law’s goals, and reviews the social 
science literature relevant to what supports, and what defeats, that 
internalization process. In light of those principles, Part IV then 
reviews social science findings relating specifically to the reduction 
of bias. Part V concludes by applying these findings to the work-
place and to employment discrimination law. 
III. PEOPLE’S MOTIVATIONS TO COMPLY WITH 
NONDISCRIMINATION NORMS 
People are as differently motivated to comply with nondiscrimi-
nation norms as they are to comply with other laws and expecta-
tions. The difference is not just a question of degree or strength, 
but also of source or quality. There are two basic sources of moti-
vation: external and internal. External motivation comes from the 
desire for approval or rewards or to avoid negative sanctions. In-
ternal motivation comes from within the individual’s personal val-
ues and identity structure. People respond to both, often at the 
same time, but as between the two, internal motivation has certain 
advantages over external motivation. Part A, below, addresses 
these advantages. Part B explores the role of law in building, or 
undermining, internal norms, and ties these principles directly to 
nondiscrimination norms. 
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A. Distinguishing External and Internal Motivation 
People are motivated by both external and internal pressure. 
Commands of an outside authority, such as a law or court order, 
motivate externally. People obey those commands to avoid nega-
tive consequences, such as legal penalties or fines. Social norms 
function in much the same way. People try to conform to those 
norms in order to gain approval (and avoid disapproval) by family, 
friends, co-workers, and other social networks.132 Approval matters 
to people because it affects self-image and self-esteem.133 People 
who might otherwise feel no internal qualms about racist jokes will 
be less likely to tell them if they know that their friends disapprove, 
just as they will be more likely to recycle or refrain from littering if 
others whose views matter will think better of them as a result.134 
Rewards serve as external motivators, as do threats. A student who 
is paid for every “A” she receives, or penalized when she does 
poorly, may study harder in order to obtain top grades. 
Internal, or intrinsic, motivation comes from people’s own sense 
of who they are and what they value. People who play the piano 
out of the pleasure they get from producing the sound rather than 
pleasing their teacher or their parents are internally motivated. 
People who work in a soup kitchen in order to be “true” to them-
selves135 are living out their self-identity. So are people who try to 
make unprejudiced judgments about others because it is the right 
thing to do, rather than something the law compels. 
The norms that people internalize typically derive from external 
rules and social norms. The internalization process, however, is 
132 For a review of social norms literature, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 339–50 (1997). 
133 See supra text accompanying notes 66–72. One of the ways law motivates 
changed behavior, McAdams writes, is to “signal[] on what grounds the majority will 
henceforth give and withhold esteem.” Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Con-
flict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1003, 1081 (1995). 
134 See generally Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and So-
cial Norms, 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603 (2000) (examining theories explaining why people 
respond positively to legal rules and social norms, and cautioning against non-
falsifiable assumptions that rules and norms actually change preferences, as opposed 
to simply incentivize behavior). 
135 See Wendy Wood, Motives and Modes of Processing in the Social Influence of 
Groups, in Dual-Process Theories, supra note 19, at 547, 553 (identifying interest of 
being true to oneself separate from interest in gaining approval of social group). 
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neither inevitable nor automatic. Certain conditions encourage it, 
and others make it less likely. According to social psychologist 
Edward Deci, whether people internalize external norms is related 
to the extent to which they feel autonomous, competent, and re-
lated to others. The needs for autonomy, competence, and related-
ness are “innate psychological nutriments that are essential for on-
going psychological growth, integrity, and well-being.”136 These are 
distinct, though related needs. Autonomy refers to the desire to 
“self-organize experience and behavior and to have activity be 
concordant with one’s integrated sense of self.”137 Competence is 
the sense of having “an effect on [one’s] environment” and a pro-
pensity “to attain valued outcomes within it.”138 Relatedness refers 
to the desire “to love and care, and to be loved and cared for.”139 
The presence of these qualities affects a person’s self-esteem. As 
it relates to the capacity to internalize norms, self-esteem is meas-
ured, importantly, not only in terms of how much of it a person 
has, but also on the type of motivation in which it is grounded. Self-
esteem based in the external need for approval is insecure. People 
with insecure self-esteem will tend to engage in behavior designed 
to satisfy their self-esteem needs, rather than other, more desirable 
social goals.140 The more insecure their self-esteem, the more ap-
proval from others is required to maintain it. As a result, insecure 
self-esteem does not support the internalization of legal and social 
norms, such as nondiscrimination; it works against them.141 In con-
trast, self-esteem that is grounded in an internal sense of auton-
omy, competence, and connectedness does not require continuous 
external reinforcement; rather, it draws on internal norms that are 
self-reinforcing. In short, insecure self-esteem needs external veri-
fication; secure self-esteem perpetuates itself. 
136  Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 227, 
229 (2000). 
137 Id. at 231. 
138 Id. at 230–31. 
139 Id. at 231. 
140 Id. at 230–32. 
141 See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: 
The Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. Personality & Soc. Psy-
chol. 835, 845 (2002) (noting that, in experimental studies, individuals with high levels 
of internal motivation and low levels of external motivation were more autonomous, 
and more effective in regulating race bias, even on tests involving responses that were 
difficult to control). 
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The benefits of internalized norms and self-esteem are substan-
tial. Research has shown that when they are internally motivated, 
people do better in protecting the environment, overcoming alco-
hol or drug addiction,142 losing weight, taking medications, and en-
gaging in school or personal relationships.143 They perform better 
especially with respect to performance that is difficult, or that re-
quires effort and persistence.144 They are also better able to recog-
nize inconsistencies between their professed values and their ac-
tions, and to dampen their own stereotyped responses to others.145 
In the workplace, people who lack a sense of autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness and thus whose self-esteem is insecure will 
tend to go through the motions of a job without caring about the 
quality of the work product.146 They will often engage in overly ag-
gressive behaviors to gain approval that have the opposite effect.147 
Sometimes they create difficult social situations because of their in-
security or sense of disconnectedness and then respond to those 
situations by trying to save face, blaming others, or otherwise act-
ing defensively.148 These are the same characteristics associated 
with the lack of internally motivated goals, and with prejudice.149 
Even successful, powerful people can have self-esteem that is 
based on the need for more external affirmation, success, and au-
thority. In fact, powerful people often depend the most on others 
142 Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 241 
(citing studies). 
143 Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilita-
tion of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 Am. Psycholo-
gist 68, 73 (2000) (citing studies). 
144 Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 241, 
243, 244. 
145 See John F. Dovidio et al., Reducing Contemporary Prejudice: Combating Ex-
plicit and Implicit Bias at the Individual and Intergroup Level, in Reducing Prejudice 
and Discrimination 137, 144–47 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (discussing evidence of 
ability of people who are internally motivated—or have “good intentions”—to regu-
late their own implicit biases). 
146 Ryan & Deci, Self-Determination Theory, supra note 143, at 72. 
147 Jennifer K. Bosson et al., Self-Enhancement Tendencies Among People With 
High Explicit Self-Esteem: The Moderating Role of Implicit Self-Esteem, 2 Self & 
Identity 169, 181 (2003). 
148 Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 251. 
149 See E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation to 
Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 811, 817–18, 826–27 
(1998). 
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for their sense of self-worth. Accordingly, those who need to 
dominate situations as a basis of self-worth tend to form more bi-
ased judgments of others than do those with the same amount of 
power who do not depend upon control over others to sustain their 
sense of self.150 
B. The Role of Law in Building, or Dissipating, Internal Motivation 
to Reduce Implicit Bias 
1. The Positive Role of Law on Norm Internalization  
While the law operates in the first instance as an external moti-
vator that defines wrongful behaviors and penalizes people who 
engage in them, it also affects people’s internal norm commit-
ments. First, the law influences people’s attitudes and beliefs by 
giving them information about the attitudes and beliefs of others.151 
Richard McAdams observes that, in the context of discrimination, 
law can help people to see that the case for discrimination is no 
longer compelling. “Rationalizations can be fragile things,” 
McAdams writes, and the law can “symboliz[e] a consensus that 
the rationalizations for [discrimination] are, in fact, mere rationali-
zations.”152 The law can stretch people’s thinking, challenging them 
to think critically about and perhaps revise their thoughts, includ-
ing judgments, decisions, and behaviors that may have been based 
on group stereotypes.153 
To the extent the law is successful in its role as external rule-
definer, it also influences internal norms through the routines and 
processes it encourages, which structure the world in which people 
150 See Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Effects of Trait Dominance on Powerhold-
ers’ Judgments of Subordinates, 19 Soc. Cognition 161, 176–77 (2001); see also 
Stephanie A. Goodwin et al., Power Can Bias Impression Processes: Stereotyping 
Subordinates by Default and by Design, 3 Group Processes Intergroup Relations 227, 
251 (2000) (stereotyping of subordinates by people with power explained by the moti-
vational pressures to maintain control, rather than by inattention, cognitive load, or 
disinterest). 
151 Richard McAdams refers to people’s mistaken beliefs about other people’s atti-
tudes as “pluralistic ignorance.” McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive 
Law, 79 Or. L. Rev. 339, 356–57 (2000). 
152 Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group 
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1003, 1081 (1995). 
153 See Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 McGeorge L. Rev. 687, 689 (2009). 
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interact with one another and thereby form beliefs and attitudes 
about each other.154 When employers institute hiring and promo-
tion procedures that put a premium on nondiscriminatory deci-
sionmaking, these procedures accustom people to accounting for 
their hiring and promotion decisions in ways that reinforce nondis-
criminatory norms. While conforming to the norms of a group may 
be prompted initially by the external pressure to conform, over 
time efforts to identify with the group help to transform internal 
attitudes and commitments as well.155 
Compliance with the law also reinforces a self-identity consistent 
with that behavior. Acting in a certain way contributes to people 
becoming people who act in a certain way. Even though I begin to 
recycle because the law requires me to do so or because I want to 
impress my friends, once I do so I become, in my own eyes and in 
the self I project to others, a person who recycles. This self-
identification reinforces my recycling habits. Conversely, littering 
makes me a litterer, meaning someone who is more likely to litter 
in the future.156 
Right behavior, in turn, educates others about what it means to 
be a good person. In this sense, law creates what Robert George 
calls a better “moral ecology,” in which all people make their mor-
ally self-constituting choices.157 In a workplace, when some people 
appear to follow nondiscrimination norms, this compliance feeds 
an environment that shapes other people’s sense of how they 
should act if they want to consider themselves good workplace citi-
zens. 
154 For a careful examination of how habit moves from rote action to a conceptually 
integrated part of one’s self-identity, see Robin R. Vallacher & Daniel M. Wegner, 
What Do People Think They’re Doing? Action Identification and Human Behavior, 
94 Psychol. Rev. 3, 4–13 (1987). 
155 See Christian S. Crandall et al., Social Norms and the Expression and Suppres-
sion of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization, 82 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
359, 375 (2002) (describing research suggesting that social norms can be internalized 
even by the individual who suppresses prejudice in order to conform to them). 
156 As put by Robert George, the law can prevent a person’s “self-corruption which 
follows from acting out a choice to indulge in immoral conduct.” Robert P. George, 
Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality 1 (1993). 
157 Id. For a discussion of how other people create the normative climate for people’s 
behavior, see Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 24 (1990). 
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2. The Negative Role of Law on Norm Internalization  
Despite these positive ways in which it strengthens public non-
discrimination norms, the law does not always have a positive ef-
fect on the internalization of norms. There are also a number of 
potential negative effects. First, when people view the law as unfair 
or overly intrusive, they tend to resist it. As a result, even when 
they comply in order to avoid the negative consequences, they will 
not internalize the law’s norms, or obey them when they can avoid 
doing so.158 Research experiments support the conclusion that peo-
ple tend to react to mandates they perceive as unfair by resisting 
the underlying goals of those mandates. In one study, for example, 
participants were leaned on by their “boss” at a food franchise to 
hire a black applicant for a job opening in order to increase the 
ethnic diversity of the company. As a result of the pressure, which 
consisted of a reminder that pay raises were to be decided in the 
next two weeks, test subjects made the decisions they were ex-
pected to make. Subsequently, however, they registered higher 
levels of anger, threat, and resentment than before, and greater 
opposition to affirmative action policies.159  
Similarly, in the corporate context, researchers have shown that 
workers tend to respond to superiors who have insulted their sense 
of identity—by means of surveillance systems, public criticism or 
other actions implying a lack of trust—by working less hard, bad 
mouthing others, or using company resources in an unauthorized 
158 See Tyler, supra note 157, at 4, 64–65, 165; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 
Common Law 39 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2009) (1881) (“The 
first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual 
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.”); Tyler, supra, at 
25, 36–37, 64–65 (discussing how law is ineffective when it is not taken seriously by 
those who wish to be law-observant). Jack Knight describes the desired relation of 
law to existing beliefs and social norms as one of pragmatism. The idea is that law 
should be sufficiently rooted in society’s existing beliefs so that it generates trust, and 
thus commands the buy-in necessary for it, in turn, to have further influence on soci-
ety’s beliefs. See Jack Knight, Social Norms and the Rule of Law: Fostering Trust in a 
Socially Diversity Society, in Trust in Society 354, 367–71 (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001). 
159 E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses to Other-Imposed Pro-Black 
Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 486 (2001). This 
response was shown by study participants with a low internal motivation to avoid 
prejudice; those who started with a high level of motivation to avoid prejudice did not 
show the same elevation of resentment or the same backlash. Id. at 498–99. 
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manner.160 These responses have their own moral imperative; in 
one study, people who reported they would respond in these ways 
thought that they would be doing the right thing.161 These re-
sponses, in turn, create the need for more surveillance and tighter 
workplace controls.162 
Another way in which the law puts itself at odds with people’s 
internalization of the law’s underlying norms is the phenomenon of 
external pressure “crowding out” internal motivation. An external 
command signals to people that they are not expected to do the 
right thing on their own; they will do so only if compelled. This sig-
nal can undermine their sense of autonomy, competence, and re-
latedness, and elicit shame, resentment and resistance, “in ways 
that include abandoning self-regulation.”163 
The “crowding out” phenomenon has been tested in a number 
of different contexts. In one well-known study, imposing a fine for 
late pickup of children from a daycare center increased, rather than 
decreased, late pickups. The theory is that whereas previously the 
parents felt an internal, moral obligation to pick up their children 
on time (although they did not always do so), the imposition of the 
fine commodified the activity, reducing the violation from a moral 
obligation to a mere matter of money. It informed parents that 
they are expected to pick up their children late from time to time, 
160 Robert J. Bies & Thomas M. Tripp, Beyond Distrust: “Getting Even” and the 
Need for Revenge, in Trust and Organizations 246, 251, 257 (Randall M. Kramer & 
Tom Tyler eds., 1996); Robert B. Cialdini, Social Influence and The Triple Tumor 
Structure of Organizational Dishonesty, in Codes of Conduct: Behavioral Research 
Into Business Ethics 44, 56–57 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996); 
Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Support of Autonomy and the Control of 
Behavior, 53 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1024, 1026 (1987); see also Ian Ayres & 
John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 53 
(1992) (finding that if legal controls are too salient, corporate actors attribute their 
compliance to the law instead of their own ethical standards). 
161 Bies & Tripp, supra note 160, at 258. 
162 See Cialdini, supra note 160, at 57. 
163 Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 160, at 25; see also Alice Erh-Soon Tay, Com-
munist Visions, Communist Realities and the Role of Law, 17 J. L. & Soc’y 155, 159–
60 (1990) (“If people be led by laws . . . and uniformity is sought to be given them by 
punishments, they will try to avoid punishments but have no sense of shame. If they 
be led by virtue . . . they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, will become 
good.”) (quoting Confucius); see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Risky Business, 94 Geo. 
L.J. 1957, 1958 (2006) (rules designed to make lawyers act ethically will not necessar-
ily motivate them to act ethically).  
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and defined that option as a choice one might make (with certain 
liquidated costs), rather than as an unacceptable breach of an obli-
gation.164 They paid more, complied less, and felt less guilty about 
it.165 Rewarding students for academic performance through such 
incentives as money, gold stars, and honor roles, likewise, may 
change the perceived nature of education from an inherently desir-
able undertaking that is worth doing well, to one that is not worth 
the effort unless the rewards are high enough.166 In another context, 
one set of studies has shown that when payment is expected for a 
task, effort improves with the level of payment, but when no pay-
ment is expected, effort is as high as the effort made with the 
higher level of payment.167 External incentives may also affect 
judgment. One commentator intuits that having an excessive num-
164 This research is described in Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 
J. Legal Stud. 1, 13–14 (2000). For citations to other research studies showing the 
“crowding-out” effect, see Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and 
the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 Yale L.J. 273, 
321–26 (2004). 
165 Gneezy & Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, supra note 164, at 13–14. Conversely, be-
ing paid for something people might readily give for free may result in less giving. In 
the context of blood donations, see Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From 
Human Blood to Social Policy (1971); see also Carl Mellström & Magnus Johannes-
son, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n 845 
(2008) (discussing a Swedish experiment finding significant crowding-out effect of 
paying for blood among women but not among men). 
166 This point is hotly debated but supported by the strong weight of the evidence. 
Compare Judy Cameron & W. David Pierce, Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic 
Motivation: A Meta-Analysis, 64 Rev. Educ. Res. 363 (1994) (concluding that rewards 
only minimally decrease intrinsic motivation), and Judy Cameron & W. David Pierce, 
The Debate About Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation: Protests and Accusations Do 
Not Alter the Results, 66 Rev. Educ. Res. 39 (1996) (arguing that the questions, 
methods and techniques used in the authors’ earlier study were appropriate and that 
their conclusions were well-founded), with Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally 
Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 105 
(1971) (finding that when money was used as an external reward, intrinsic motivation 
tended to decrease, and when verbal reinforcement and positive feedback were used, 
intrinsic motivation tended to increase), and Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic 
Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Mo-
tivation, 125 Psychol. Bull. 627 (1999) (concluding from a meta-analysis of 128 studies 
that rewards significantly undermine free-choice intrinsic motivation), and Edward L. 
Deci et al., Extrinsic Reward and Intrinsic Motivation in Education: Reconsidered 
Once Again, 71 Rev. Educ. Res. 1 (2001) (finding that more recent studies support 
the argument that external rewards decrease intrinsic motivation). 
167 See James Heyman & Dan Ariely, Effort for Payment: A Tale of Two Markets, 
15 Psychol. Sci. 787, 790–91 (2004). 
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ber of stop signs, posted speed limits, and other road regulations 
train drivers to drive by the signs rather than develop their own 
good judgment.168 The theory, again, is that rules thwart the inter-
nalization process, which itself increases reliance on rules.169 
Increased legal coercion also works at odds with the internaliza-
tion of desirable norms by signaling that other people would not 
otherwise adhere to those norms. This message is a negative influ-
ence,170 to the extent that it suggests that the underlying norm does 
not reflect people’s actual commitments, but rather standards that 
people would not follow unless the law imposed them. This phe-
nomenon could help explain why, in one study, showing a sexual 
harassment policy to men had the unexpected effect of activating, 
rather than suppressing, gender stereotypes.171 
The point is not that external norms must be avoided because 
they necessarily undermine the internalization of norms.172 External 
norms cannot be avoided and are necessary to give content to the 
values and expectations we seek people to internalize. Internaliza-
tion, however, is not an inevitable consequence of legal coercion 
and may even be stifled by it. Excessively controlling, intrusive, or 
alienating contexts displaces people’s sense of their own moral 
compass. Excessive control also leads people to engage in defen-
sive or self-protective processes, disown responsibility for negative 
outcomes, and blame others.173 
These negative reactions to coercion and threat are damaging 
specifically to people’s ability to internalize the nondiscrimination 
norms necessary to combat implicit bias. Researchers have been 
able to distinguish between people who are motivated primarily to 
avoid issues of discrimination, and those motivated primarily to 
168 See John Staddon, Distracting Miss Daisy, 302 The Atlantic 102 (July/August 
2008). 
169 The failure to recognize the tendency for incentives to increase the need for in-
centives when norms are not internalized is the major weakness of an account of so-
cial norms that rests on incentives alone. For such an account, see Scott, supra note 
134. 
170 McAdams, supra note 151, at 3–24. 
171 See Justine Eatenson Tinkler et al., Can Legal Interventions Change Beliefs? The 
Effect of Exposure to Sexual Harassment Policy on Men’s Gender Beliefs, 70 Soc. 
Psychol. Q. 480, 491 (2007). 
172 See Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 
236–38. 
173 Id. at 229; Ryan & Deci, Self-Determination Theory, supra note 143, at 73. 
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avoid prejudice itself.174 Individuals motivated primarily by a desire 
to escape the disapproval of others, stay out of trouble, and avoid 
conflict are externally motivated. In contrast, people who seek to 
avoid prejudice have integrated the goal of nondiscrimination into 
their other values; they seek to enact these values, not simply avoid 
the negative reactions of the law, employers, family, or friends. 
Studies show that individuals motivated more by a desire to 
avoid dispute than to avoid prejudice tend to stay away from situa-
tions in which they might interact with blacks, especially when the 
situation is unscripted or uncertain.175 These individuals are more 
likely to imagine unpleasant interactions, and thus more likely to 
avoid them.176 In contrast, those with a strong internal motivation 
to avoid prejudice itself are more likely to imagine positive interac-
tions with blacks, even when the scripts or expectations are less 
clear, and thus more likely to engage others not like themselves.177 
174 To measure the motivation to avoid prejudice, the Motivation to Control Preju-
diced Reactions scale uses a questionnaire that asks participants to indicate on a five-
point scale his or her level of agreement with such statements as, “If I were participat-
ing in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion with which I dis-
agreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint,” or her level of disagree-
ment with such statements as “I think that it is important to speak one’s mind rather 
than to worry about offending someone.” The motivation to avoid prejudice is meas-
ured by the individual’s extent of agreement with such statements as, “I feel guilty 
when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person,” or “I get angry with 
myself when I have a thought or feeling that might be considered prejudiced.” Bridget 
C. Dunton & Russell H. Fazio, An Individual Difference Measure of Motivation to 
Control Prejudiced Reactions, 23 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 316, 319 (1997). 
175 Tamara Towles-Schwen & Russell H. Fazio, Choosing Social Situations: The Re-
lation Between Automatically Activated Racial Attitudes and Anticipated Comfort 
Interacting With African Americans, 29 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 170, 178 
(2003). Possible influences of the different motivations are suggested by the fact that 
those with high desire to avoid dispute reported less frequent interactions in school 
with blacks, admitted that their exposure to blacks during childhood was primarily 
through television and the media, and rated their parents as more prejudiced. In con-
trast, those with a high concern to avoid prejudice reported parental emphasis on 
egalitarianism, high scores on tests of egalitarian values, and relatively positive inter-
actions with blacks during elementary and middle school. Id. at 172. 
176 Id. at 179–80. 
177 Id. Another difference is that people with a strong concern for avoiding prejudice 
are more likely to “overcorrect” in evaluating blacks as a group, while those with a 
strong concern for avoiding conflict are more likely to overcorrect for judgments 
about individual blacks, which researchers attribute to the possibility that making a 
situation more personal evokes a greater likelihood that a dispute will arise. See Mi-
chael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Trait Inferences as a Function of Automatically 
Activated Racial Attitudes and Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions, 26 Basic 
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This difference suggests that those individuals with more internal-
ized nondiscrimination values—whose interactions are already the 
most positive—are the ones most likely to put themselves in situa-
tions where their prejudiced attitudes will be (still further) re-
duced.178 
Research on gender attitudes also has distinguished between in-
ternal and external motivation and found similar patterns. In one 
set of studies, test subjects whose desire to avoid sexism was based 
on external pressure rather than internalized norms rated sexist 
jokes negatively only when the circumstances risked disapproval by 
others. When the circumstances supported a sexist response (for 
example, the joke teller appearing to like the joke) and when the 
response was private, only test subjects whose non-sexist norms 
were personally important to them showed a reduced level of sexist 
response to sexist jokes. The other test subjects did not.179 
The premise of most of the legal reforms designed to make it 
easier for plaintiffs to win their cases is that people can try harder if 
the law leans on them more heavily. The motivation research dis-
cussed above, however, suggests that law alone will not activate the 
responses need to combat subtle, discriminatory behaviors, and 
may even undermine them. Part IV explores these principles fur-
ther, in the context of research about what factors seem to matter 
in reducing these kinds of behaviors. 
IV. STRATEGIES TO REDUCE IMPLICIT BIAS 
Although social psychologists frequently note the difficulties of 
controlling stereotypes that are by definition unconscious and 
automatic,180 most experts conclude that stereotypes are not per-
& Applied Soc. Psychol. 1, 9–10 (2004). On the overcorrection phenomenon, see su-
pra text accompanying notes 78–87. 
178 See E. Ashby Plant, Responses to Interracial Interactions Over Time, 30 Person-
ality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1458, 1469–70 (2004) (people who are internally motivated 
to avoid prejudice have more positive relationships with people of other races, and 
thus have better expectancies and less anxiety about future contact). Women tend to 
test higher than men for internally motivated avoidance of prejudice. See Plant & 
Devine, supra note 149. 
179 See Suzanne C. Klonis et al., Internal and External Motivation to Respond With-
out Sexism, 31 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 1237, 1246 (2005). 
180 See, e.g., Bargh, The Cognitive Monster, supra note 19, at 362, 376, 378 (control-
ling the influence of unconscious stereotypes is “almost unimaginable”); William T. 
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manent, but rather alterable.181 The two variables most often noted 
are (1) effort,182 and (2) situational context.183 Both effort and situa-
tion matter,184 and motivation plays a key role in determining how 
they do so, as this Part explains. 
A. Effort 
Research about the role of effort in reducing stereotypes ap-
pears to conflict. Some studies show that the effort to stop stereo-
typing might actually increase it, while others conclude that effort 
can have a beneficial effect on reducing stereotyped thinking. 
Bielby, Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias, 29 Contemp. Soc. 120, 122 
(2000) (“The task is not to eliminate ‘stereotypical thinking’ (it can’t be done), but 
rather to minimize its impact on personnel decisions.”); Timothy D. Wilson et al., 
Mental Contamination and the Debiasing Problem, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psy-
chology of Intuitive Judgment 185, 190 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (expressing 
a lack of optimism about people detecting and correcting for bias in everyday life). 
181 See, e.g., Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Preju-
dice, 6 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 242 (2002). For a review of some of the litera-
ture, see Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in 
Stereotyping, in Dual-Process Theories, supra note 19, at 339–42. 
182 See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and 
Controlled Components, 56 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 6–7 (1989); Daniel T. 
Gilbert et al., Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the Rejection of False 
Information, 59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 601, 611 (1990); Mitchell, supra note 
153, at 687–88. 
183 Dual-process theories of stereotyping presuppose a pre-conscious (automatic) 
and a conscious (controlled) process, but sometimes the boundary between the two is 
softened by a “counterintuitive” notion that intent, will, and control “can operate 
without awareness.” See Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., The History of Dual-Process 
Notions, and the Future of Preconscious Control, in Dual-Process Theories, supra 
note 19, at 12, 33. In this regard, one set of researchers makes a helpful distinction be-
tween “deliberative and theory-driven” correction (or “debiasing”) and “rapid and 
nonconscious” correction (or “implicit adjustment”). See Wilson et al., supra note 
180, at 185, 188–89. 
184 Mitchell, supra note 153, at 695–96 (identifying a broad continuum of processes 
through which attitudes can change, ranging from deliberate, conscious effort, to de-
tectable (if usually unnoticed) thoughts and habits, to unconscious thinking styles and 
situation-induced goals). This observation is consistent with a variety of stereotype 
control strategies, from suppressing them once they arise, to actively seeking out in-
formation beyond the stereotype, overriding a stereotypic response with a clearly 
identifiable egalitarian response, or correcting a response in a direction opposite from 
the presumed influence of the stereotype. Studies demonstrating these various strate-
gies are cited in Margo J. Monteith et al., Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the 
Development and Operation of Cues for Control, 83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
1029, 1030 (2002). 
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The research showing that effort increases rather than decreases 
stereotyping suggests that the concentration on ignoring a charac-
teristic upon which a stereotype is based heightens the salience of 
the characteristic, thereby making the stereotype harder to control. 
In addition, the effort to appear unprejudiced to others can 
heighten anxiety about the characteristic, thereby triggering the 
automatic, nonverbal behaviors that this anxiety produces. Alone 
or together, these cognitive and attitudinal factors can lead to what 
is called a suppression “rebound effect,”185 in which even if effort 
suppresses stereotypes in the first instance, stereotypes return with 
greater force when the pressure is relaxed.186 
One set of experimental studies supporting the existence of the 
rebound effect found that test subjects who were warned against 
using stereotypes were able to do so in specific exercises, but then 
when given no such warning in subsequent exercises, they exhib-
ited more stereotypes than the control group.187 When shown out of 
the room “after” one set of suppression exercises, test subjects who 
had suppressed stereotypes during the exercise chose seats further 
away from the black man whose picture had been used in the exer-
cises.188 The rebound effect can be subtle. In one experimental 
study, whites who tried hardest to appear color-blind were less 
likely to use race as a descriptor when describing other individuals 
to black partners, but this reluctance impaired communication and 
performance; these whites also made less eye contact with and ap-
peared less friendly to their black partners.189 
185 See C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight: Stereotypes on the Re-
bound, 67 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 808, 808–09 (1994). 
186 See Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effect of Training in 
the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. Personality 
& Soc. Psychol. 871 (2000); Macrae, supra note 185, at 814. 
187 Macrae, supra note 185, at 811. 
188 Id. at 812. Another related effect is that the effort to produce one stereotype may 
alter the stereotype rather than eliminate it. See Sei Jin Do et al., Sneaking in 
Through the Back Door: How Category-Based Stereotype Suppression Leads to Re-
bound in Feature-Based Effects, 44 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 833, 833–34 (2008). 
For example, pressure to reduce race-based stereotyping might lessen stereotyping of 
blacks whose physical and social profiles are more similar to whites, while increasing 
it with respect to blacks with more Afrocentric features, or weaker resumes. 
189 See Michael I. Norton et al., Color Blindness and Interracial Interaction: Playing 
the Political Correctness Game, 17 Psychol. Sci. 949, 952 (2006). 
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Experiments testing the effect of trying to suppress sex-based 
stereotypes have shown comparable results. In one study, male and 
female subjects were asked to complete a series of sentence frag-
ments, such as “Women who go out with a lot of men are . . . .”190 In 
the study, subjects who were given the instruction to try not to be 
sexist in their responses gave fewer sexist responses (for example, 
“sluts”) and more “egalitarian” responses (for example, “popular”) 
when they were given time to think. When immediate responses 
were required, however, they gave more sexist responses when in-
structed not be sexist than when given no instruction at all.191 
In contrast to this research are studies demonstrating that atten-
tion and effect can have a positive effect on altering stereotypes.192 
For example, experimental studies have shown that blatant priming 
tips people off that they may be subject to a potentially biasing in-
fluence, thereby triggering a successful effort to avoid stereotyped 
judgments.193 Rote training exercises associating nonstereotypic 
traits with men and women also has been shown to reduce stereo-
typing, although the effect is not shown if the trainees make an ef-
fort to resist the training.194 In a simulated job interview setting, in-
terviewers who were given special encouragement to form accurate 
impressions exhibited less bias than those who were given no such 
encouragement; they also conducted longer interviews and asked 
190 Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 Psychol. Rev. 34, 46–
47 (1994). The study’s questions were drawn from the Attitudes Toward Women 
Scale developed by Spence and Helmreich. Janet T. Spence & Robert Helmreich, The 
Attitudes Toward Women Scale: An Objective Instrument to Measure Attitudes To-
ward the Rights and Roles of Women in Contemporary Society, JSAS Catalog of Se-
lected Documents in Psychology (1972). 
191 See Wegner, supra note 190, at 46–47. Wegner theorizes that this effect is caused 
by two different processes at work: an “operating” process that searches for mental 
content consistent with the desired state, and a “monitoring” process that seeks out, 
and thereby reinforces, inconsistent information. Id. at 34. Wegner calls this explana-
tion “ironic process theory.” Id. 
192 Blair, supra note 181, at 252. 
193 See Leonard S. Newman & James S. Uleman, Assimilation and Contrast Effects 
in Spontaneous Trait Inference, 16 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 224, 236 (1990); 
Fritz Strack et al., Awareness of the Influence as a Determinant of Assimilation Ver-
sus Contrast, 23 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 53, 59 (1993). 
194 See, e.g., Kerry Kawakami et al., Kicking the Habit: Effects of Nonstereotypic 
Association Training and Correction Processes on Hiring Decisions, 41 J. Experimen-
tal Soc. Psychol. 68, 73–74 (2005) (rote training in associating nonstereotypic traits 
with men and women can reduce stereotyping, unless trainees make an effort to resist 
training). 
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better questions, thus gathering more and better information.195 In 
other studies, telling people that they were going to be held ac-
countable for the accuracy of a decision, and to whom, had a posi-
tive effect on non-stereotyped decisionmaking.196 Likewise, job per-
formance exercises instructing people to recall and write out both 
positive and negative behaviors of the person before reaching a 
performance rating appeared to reduce the impact of both race and 
gender bias.197 In other research, asking people to write narrative 
essays about individuals whose perspective they were asked to as-
sume led them to express more positive evaluations of those indi-
viduals and make fewer stereotypical comments, as compared to 
subjects given no special instructions, or those who were told sim-
ply to try to avoid stereotypic preconceptions.198 These studies in 
various ways lend support to various “dual-process” theories of 
stereotyping positing that people, with effort or time for reflection, 
can overcome their first, stereotyped response to a stimulus 
through more thoughtful and deliberative cognitive processing.199 
195 Neuberg, The Goal of Forming Accurate Impressions, supra note 55, at 378–79; 
see also Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, 
From Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Mo-
tivation on Attention and Interpretation, in 23 Advances in Experimental Social Psy-
chology 1, 49 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 1990); Neuberg, Expectancy-Confirmation Proc-
esses, supra note 45, at 103, 111–14. On the importance of strategies that encourage 
people to obtain more information in order to form a more accurate assessment, see 
Monteith et al., supra note 184, at 1030. 
196 See John Pennington & Barry R. Schlenker, Accountability for Consequential 
Decisions: Justifying Ethical Judgments to Audiences, 25 Personality & Soc. Psychol. 
Bull. 1067 (1999); Philip E. Tetlock & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Social Contingency 
Model: Identifying Empirical and Normative Boundary Conditions on the Error-and-
Bias Portrait of Human Nature, in Dual-Process Theories, supra note 19, at 578; see 
also Leigh Ann Vaughn et al., When Two Wrongs Can Make a Right: Regulatory 
Nonfit, Bias, and Correction of Judgments, 42 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 654, 659 
(2006) (accuracy instructions improve correction of bias). 
197 See Boris B. Baltes et al., Does a Structured Free Recall Intervention Reduce the 
Effect of Stereotypes on Performance Ratings and by What Cognitive Mechanism?, 
92 J. Applied Psychol. 151, 157, 159, 161 (2007) (discussing race bias); Cara C. Bauer 
& Boris B. Baltes, Reducing the Effects of Gender Stereotypes on Performance 
Evaluations, 47 Sex Roles 465, 468 (2002) (discussing gender bias). 
198 Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing 
Stereotype Expression, Stereotype Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. Per-
sonality & Soc. Psychol. 708, 720 (2000). 
199 For articles on dual-process theories of overcoming prejudice, see Dual-Process 
Theories in Social Psychology, supra note 183. The two stages are sometimes distin-
guished as System I and System II thinking. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 94, at 
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Viewing this research through a motivation lens helps to make 
sense of the apparently conflicting findings about the role of effort. 
To the extent that individual effort depends upon external pres-
sure, motivation principles would predict that behavior will con-
form to the desired norms only as long as that pressure exists, and 
that once the pressure lets up, autonomy will be reasserted and be-
havior will revert to prior habits. When the pressure is great 
enough or conflicts with existing beliefs and attitudes, these princi-
ples would also predict that attitudes might regress, as the individ-
ual pushes back in reaction to the resented control.  
Likewise, it should be no surprise that individual effort that re-
flects, or enhances, an internalized commitment to nondiscrimina-
tion norms or overlaps with other goals, such as accurate outcomes 
or responsibility or accountability toward norms by respected oth-
ers, would strengthen or reinforce those norms. Effort that pro-
duces information or encourages a more open or empathetic per-
spective would be expected to support the internalization of 
nondiscrimination norms, and thus to have a more positive and 
more lasting effect than pressure that is not supported by actual be-
liefs or attitudes.200 Even not-so-subtle priming would be expected 
to produce better results than more coercive influence, insofar as it 
allows individuals to identify and assert their own, conscious stan-
dards, rather than react to the imposed standards of others.201 
Some experimental research also suggests that how the effort to 
avoid stereotypes is evoked can affect the motivation of the effort, 
and thus the difference that it makes. For example, efforts that are 
promoted with positive signals rather than negative ones seem to 
975; Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intui-
tive Judgment, supra note 180, at 49, 50. Gregory Mitchell characterizes the difference 
as “initial thoughts” and “second thoughts.” Mitchell, supra note 153, at 687–88. For 
another distinction, see supra note 183. 
200 Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 198, at 709, 720 (describing how perspective-
taking motivates people by increasing the overlap between the self and the target of 
the perspective-taking). 
201 On the connection between the internalization of motivation and its effect on ef-
forts to reduce bias, see Crandall et al., supra note 155, at 372–73; M. Michelle Pe-
ruche & E. Ashby Plant, Racial Bias in Perceptions of Athleticism: The Role of Moti-
vation in the Elimination of Bias, 24 Soc. Cognition 438, 449–50 (2006). 
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have a better effect.202 Again, this contrast makes sense once differ-
ences in motivation are taken into account. Positive signals affirm 
and thus strengthen people’s sense of identity with the desired 
norms, and thus help them to internalize those norms. Negative 
signals put people at odds with the authority, make them defensive 
about their failure to satisfy the authority’s norms, and thus alien-
ates them from those norms. 
B. Exposure and Contact 
Exposure to others, like effort, can have either a positive or a 
negative impact on intergroup attitudes. People can come in con-
tact with others at various levels of intensity, ranging from merely 
observing counterstereotyped images, being in the presence of 
those presumed to have certain beliefs, or working closely with 
people from other groups. At each of these levels, intergroup ex-
posure can threaten, or strengthen, feelings of autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness, and thus thereby affect people’s motivation 
to avoid discriminatory behavior. 
1. Counterstereotypes 
Even intergroup exposure that is remote and impersonal can 
challenge and help alter stereotypes or attitudes that people hold 
about members of other groups. For example, priming exercises 
that pair positive words with black faces and negative words with 
white faces can reduce test subjects’ scores on implicit bias tests.203 
So can images of admired blacks like Tiger Woods, Denzel Wash-
ington, and Michael Jordan, disliked whites like Jeffrey Dahmer 
and Timothy McVeigh,204 and portrayals of blacks in positive set-
202 The research is summarized in Gaertner et al., supra note 23, at 391–92. See also 
Gaertner & Dovidio, Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Racism, supra 
note 8, at 615, 633 (promoting positive thoughts works better than avoiding negative 
ones to improve interracial attitudes). For a more specific application of this point, 
see infra text accompanying notes 287–292. 
203 See Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing Automatically Activated 
Racial Prejudice through Implicit Evaluative Conditioning, 32 Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. Bull. 421, 429 (2006). The effects persisted throughout a two-day separation 
between the conditioning procedure and the administration of the IAT. Id. 
204 See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of 
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and 
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tings such as family barbeques or church, as compared to negative 
settings like a dilapidated street corner.205 
Experiments that expose test subjects to members of minority 
groups in roles of authority also undermine customary stereotypes 
in some research settings. For example, a number of studies have 
shown that white participants tend to exhibit less automatic stereo-
type activation on implicit bias tests in the presence of an experi-
menter who is black rather than white.206 Even showing blacks in a 
neutral setting may dilute stereotypes.207 Likewise, exposure to fe-
male leadership can reduce gender stereotyping. For example, 
among women students who started college with comparable 
scores on automatic bias tests, those who attended women’s col-
leges where they had frequent contact with women faculty showed 
less automatic bias after one year than those who attended coedu-
cational institutions where the contact with women leaders was 
relatively less frequent.208 In another study, asking test subjects to 
Disliked Individuals, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 800, 806–07 (2001). The effect 
persisted when tested twenty-four hours later. Id. at 807. 
205 See Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Spontaneous Prejudice in Context: Variability in 
Automatically Activated Attitudes, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 815, 817, 823–24 
(2001). 
206 See Russell H. Fazio et al., Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtru-
sive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 1013 (1995); Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic 
Racial Prejudice, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 842, 845 (2001). The Lowery study, 
however, showed no reduction in automatic prejudice by Asian-American test-takers 
as measured by the IAT, except in a subsequent experiment in which some partici-
pants were instructed to avoid prejudice (or not) in the presence of the black experi-
menter. Id. at 847–49. 
207 In one experiment, negative black stereotypes diminished after participants were 
exposed to a videotape of an interview with a black person for an average of ten min-
utes or more. See Ziva Kunda et al., The Dynamic Time Course of Stereotype Activa-
tion: Activation, Dissipation, and Resurrection, 82 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 283, 
295 (2002). In this study, the staging of even a relatively trivial disagreement with the 
interviewee resurrected the stereotype, as measured in a test for implicit bias, but the 
activation of the stereotype did not appear to affect the participants’ evaluation of the 
interviewee; in other words, stereotypes were activated, but apparently suppressed. 
Id. at 295–96. 
208 See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing is Believing: Exposure to Coun-
terstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gen-
der Stereotyping, 40 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 642, 653–54 (2004); see also M. 
Elizabeth Tidball et al., Taking Women Seriously: Lessons and Legacies for Educat-
ing the Majority (1999) (finding a strong link between frequency of counterstereo-
BARTLETT_BOOK 11/18/2009  6:10 PM 
2009] Making Good on Good Intentions 1949 
 
imagine strong women—what they are like, why they are strong, 
what they are capable of doing, and what kinds of hobbies and ac-
tivities they enjoy—reduced their implicit gender bias test scores.209 
As would be expected, the strength and duration of these effects 
are limited by the degree of exposure. When exposure is brief, so 
are its effects.210 Frequency of contact and salience would be ex-
pected to improve the effectiveness of counterstereotypes.211 Thus, 
publicly visible portraits and statues are likely to have greater posi-
tive impact than single exposures. Likewise, when women and mi-
norities are in high positions for a sustained period and with a re-
cord of success, their impact on stereotypes will likely be greater 
than when circumstances seem to suggest that their counterstereo-
typical role was a fluke, or when it appears to confirm the stereo-
type that women and minorities are not meant for positions of re-
sponsibility in the public realm. 
Positive effects also may be limited by how broadly a counter-
vailing influence is generalized to the group as a whole. As noted 
earlier, a feature of stereotypes is that they tend to repel disproving 
data; people often process information that conflicts with a stereo-
type as an exception to a robust rule of thumb, rather than a reason 
to modify the stereotype.212 Thus, Tiger Woods might elicit positive 
feelings about himself as a talented individual or perhaps increase 
positive attitudes about black athletes, but his example may not 
improve people’s judgments about blacks in general. He is viewed 
as an outlier—someone who proves blacks can be admirable peo-
typic female role models on campus (for example, faculty, administrators, and peers) 
and the cultivation of students’ commitment to counterstereotypic careers). 
209 Irene V. Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit 
Stereotypes Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 828, 837 
(2001). For a review of other studies, see Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereo-
types and Prejudices, supra note 181, at 248–49. 
210 Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 204, at 806–07 (improved effect of images of 
admired blacks and dislike whites on automatic stereotypes was significantly dimin-
ished twenty-four hours later). 
211 On the concept of “construct-accessibility,” see E. Tory Higgins & Gillian King, 
Accessibility of Social Constructs: Information-Processing Consequences of Individ-
ual and Contextual Variability, in Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction 69, 71 
(Nancy Cantor & John F. Kihlstrom eds., 1981); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, 
Jr., Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some Implications for the Study of 
Person Memory and Interpersonal Judgments, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 841 
(1980). 
212 See supra text accompanying notes 46 and 55. 
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ple, but not that they usually are.213 For generalization to occur, re-
mote or passing exposure to counter-stereotypes may not be 
enough. 
2. Minimal Contact and Peer Influence  
Researchers have shown, in many different contexts, that the 
physical presence of other people can attenuate bias. In university 
settings, for example, students revealed less bias on an implicit bias 
test if they took the test in the physical presence of other students 
than if they took the test alone.214 The presence of blacks seems 
particularly to motivate whites to be more attentive to race is-
sues.215 For example, students noticed more prejudice in a film clip 
when they were told that they were being watched by one or two 
blacks in the adjacent room.216 In an experiment involving a simu-
lated trial of a black defendant, whites who sat on racially mixed 
juries tended to discuss more case facts, were less likely to chal-
lenge the possibility of racism, and were more likely to vote for ac-
quittal.217  
Some researchers explain this effect by a theory of “social tun-
ing.” Social tuning theory posits that people generally prefer to 
have positive interactions with others, and that they bring their 
own attitudes in line with the presumed views of others in order to 
have those positive interactions.218 Some researchers describe a 
213 In addition to the social psychology experiments demonstrating this phenome-
non, there is some physiological support. See E.A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indi-
rect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. Cognitive 
Neuroscience 729, 733–34 (2000) (while the amygdalae of whites typically over-react 
to black faces in experimental settings, they do not do so with famous black faces). 
For citations to research on strategies to promote the generalization of counterstereo-
types, see infra note 238. 
214 See Luigi Castelli & Silvia Tomelleri, Contextual Effects on Prejudiced Attitudes: 
When the Presence of Others Leads to More Egalitarian Responses, 44 J. Experimen-
tal Soc. Psychol. 679, 683–84 (2008). 
215 Robinson, supra note 8, at 1177. 
216 See Daisuke Akiba & Payneese Miller, The Expression of Cultural Sensitivity in 
the Presence of African Americans: An Analysis of Motives, 35 Small Group Res. 
623, 637 (2004). 
217 See Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making: Iden-
tifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. Personal-
ity & Soc. Psychol. 597, 603–06 (2006). 
218 See Lowery et al., supra note 206, at 843; Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of 
the Self: Consequences for the Self-Evaluations of Stereotype Targets, 89 J. Personal-
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more general tendency of people to assimilate to a perceived so-
cially shared norm.219 Consistent with both theories, it appears that 
the likeability of others enhances people’s motivation to adapt to 
the attitudes they are thought to have.220 Likewise, having power 
over others appears to weaken that motivation; people with power 
show more implicit bias toward their subordinates than those in-
teracting with someone who is their superior or co-equal.221 
People’s attitudes about members of other groups are especially 
influenced by people they perceive to be their peers, whose views 
often appear to be more important than people’s own personal ex-
periences.222 Like other situational factors, these influences can ei-
ther reinforce bias, or reduce it.223 
ity & Soc. Psychol. 160 (2005). Social tuning is exhibited even in simple exchanges, 
such as when people use social categorization cues (such as accents and clothing) to 
determine how to respond to a request for local directions. See Ellen A. Isaacs & 
Herbert H. Clark, References in Conversation Between Experts and Novices, 116 J. 
Experimental Psychol.: Gen. 26, 31 (1987). 
219 See Castelli & Tomelleri, supra note 214, at 684; see also Crandall et al., supra 
note 155, at 361; Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influ-
ences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. Personality & Soc. Psy-
chol. 645, 651 (2001). 
220 See Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of the Self, supra note 218. These attitudes can 
be either positive or negative ones. See Castelli & Tomelleri, supra note 214, at 684; 
see also Crandall et al., supra note 155, at 361; Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 219, at 
651. 
221 Stacey Sinclair et al., Social Tuning of Automatic Racial Attitudes: The Role of 
Affiliative Motivation, 89 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 583, 584 (2005); see also 
Richard Y. Bourhis, Power, Gender, and Intergroup Discrimination: Some Minimal 
Group Experiments, in The Psychology of Prejudice, supra note 38, at 200 (making 
the same conclusion with respect to gender bias); Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Am-
bady, Effects of Situational Power on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. Experimental 
Soc. Psychol. 177 (2003) (noting that in experimental studies, people assigned supe-
rior roles tend to register higher on implicit race bias tests and exhibit more stereotyp-
ing behavior when evaluating others as compared to those who hold equal or subor-
dinate status with those they are evaluating). The differential effects may be related 
to why interaction between individuals who function as equals is more successful in 
reducing prejudice than in hierarchical relationships. See infra text accompanying 
note 232; see also supra, text accompanying note 150 (people who need to dominate 
situations are more prone to biased evaluations of others). 
222 See, e.g., Bruno Lasker, Race Attitudes in Children 371 (1929); see also Muzafer 
Sherif & Carolyn W. Sherif, Groups in Harmony and Tension 94–95 (1953) (develop-
ing “group norm theory” to explain the pressures on individuals to conform to group 
norms); Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 219 at 645. 
223 See Sherif & Sherif, supra note 222; see also Crandall et al., supra note 155, at 361 
(concluding that social norms are strong predictors of expressed prejudice). 
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Research in university campus settings has demonstrated in par-
ticular the importance of peer influence on attitudes about race. In 
various experiments, students’ attitudes about race were affected 
by exposure to the views of other students.224 A series of experi-
ments involving students from the University of Maryland suggest 
that peer influence about race outweighs more rational or evi-
dence-based factors. One experiment had students estimate (1) the 
percentage of black students who possessed 16 stereotypical traits 
and (2) how the same judgments would be made by the average 
University of Maryland student. One week later, some students 
were given feedback suggesting that other University of Maryland 
students shared their beliefs and others were given the opposite 
feedback. The students who were told that their peers had more 
favorable views of blacks than they had predicted themselves regis-
tered more favorable attitudes when retested. Those told that their 
peers had more negative views than they had predicted registered 
more negative stereotypes when tested again.225 In a follow-up ex-
periment, students were exposed to supposedly “scientific informa-
tion” about what percentage of blacks possessed each trait. In later 
testing, whether the “scientific information” mattered to their own 
views, or their estimates of other people’s views, depended upon 
the consistency between peer attitudes and their own. When peer 
attitudes supported the students’ original estimates, the data did 
not change them. When they did not, the data had more influence 
on students’ subsequent views.226  
The greater the identification with peers, the more influence 
peers have on beliefs and attitudes. For example, students in one 
study were more influenced by the attitudes of students at their 
own college than they were by the attitudes of students from a rival 
224 See, e.g., Fletcher A. Blanchard et al., Condemning and Condoning Racism: A 
Social Context Approach to Interracial Settings, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 993, 995 
(1994) (hearing another student condemn racism, or condone it); Fletcher A. Blanch-
ard et al., Reducing the Expression of Racial Prejudice, 2 Psychol. Sci. 101, 101–03 
(1991) (hearing another student express their views about a campus incident with po-
tential race overtones); Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 220, at 649–51 (being told of 
the racial views of other students). 
225 Charles Stangor et al., Changing Racial Beliefs by Providing Consensus Informa-
tion, 27 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 486, 489–90 (2001). 
226 Id. at 492–93. 
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college.227 Simply knowing of friendships between members of 
one’s own group and those of another, however, may be enough to 
improve a person’s attitude toward that other group.228 Notably, the 
University of Maryland research indicates that it is easier to influ-
ence attitudes in a positive direction than in a negative one.229 
Learning that one’s attitudes are shared by others has the poten-
tial to affect behavior as well as measured attitudes. In one of the 
University of Maryland studies, students indicated their attitudes 
about blacks on a computerized test, and then were given (false) 
feedback about the extent to which their responses agreed with 
other University of Maryland students. They were then (on a false 
pretense) led to a room and told to take a seat where a black fe-
male was already seated. Students who tested high for prejudice 
toward blacks and who were told that a high percentage of Mary-
land students agreed with them sat further away from the black 
female than students who had been told that only a minority of 
others agreed with them.230 
3. Working Relationships and the “Contact Hypothesis”  
Moving beyond visual images, mere physical presence, and peer 
influence, research experiments demonstrate that interaction be-
tween members of different groups in the workplace are, under the 
right circumstances, the most important factor in reducing group-
based stereotypes in the workplace. In 1954, Gordon Allport iden-
tified a number of factors that appeared to determine whether 
group contact generated more positive attitudes toward that group. 
The factors set forth in Allport’s “contact hypothesis” included 
equal status between the groups, common goals, the interdepend-
ence of the groups, and the positive support of authorities, laws, or 
custom.231 
227 Id. at 491–92. 
228 See Stephen C. Wright et al., The Extended Contact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-
Group Friendships and Prejudice, 73 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 73, 74 (1997). 
229 Stangor et al., supra note 225, at 493. 
230 Sechrist & Stangor, supra note 219, at 649. 
231 Dovidio et al., supra note 145, at 147; see Allport, supra note 38, at 281. Much re-
search has affirmed the basic principles of the contact hypothesis. For reviews and 
updates, see On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport 8–9 (John F. 
Dovidio et al. eds., 2005); John F. Dovidio et al., Intergroup Bias: Status, Differentia-
tion, and a Common In-Group Identity, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 109, 109–10 
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Follow-up research has confirmed the importance of Allport’s 
four key conditions and refined the basic findings. Equal status 
within the situation matters; even when the people differ in status 
outside the interaction, having equal status within the interaction 
has a positive effect.232 The existence of common goals also matters, 
as long as the effort toward achieving them is structured to be co-
operative rather than competitive.233 And explicit support from au-
thorities is highly significant; without it, the positive effects of 
equal status and common goals may be negated.234 Indeed, without 
all of these conditions working together, workplace interactions 
may reinforce group stereotyping rather than weaken it.235 
One explanation for the positive impact of contact on intergroup 
bias is that it reduces the salience of race and sex.236 The underlying 
mechanism appears to be both cognitive and motivational. Cogni-
tively, intergroup contact decategorizes group boundaries, so that 
group members view themselves and others more as either indi-
viduals, or part of one larger group—and less as members of sepa-
rate, competing groups. Motivationally, forming a “common group 
identity” triggers the same positive attitudes that characterize in-
group bias, therefore leading people to see each other more gener-
ously.237 This effect is greatest, some researchers have noted, if suf-
ficient salience of the original groups is preserved, so that changed 
attitudes toward the individuals with whom people are in contact 
(1998); Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup 
Contact Theory, 90 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 751, 751 (2006). 
232 Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Allport’s Intergroup Contact Hypothe-
sis: Its History and Influence, in On the Nature of Prejudice, supra note 231, at 265. 
233 Id.; David W. Johnson & Roger T. Johnson, The Three Cs of Reducing Prejudice 
and Discrimination, in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination 239, 249 (Stuart Os-
kamp ed., 2000) (concluding a meta-analysis of 180 studies shows strong effect of co-
operative experiences over competitive ones in reducing prejudice). 
234 Johnson & Johnson, supra note 233, at 249. 
235 See, e.g., Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Lynn Smith-Lovin, The Gender System and In-
teraction, 25 Ann. Rev. Soc. 191, 209 (1999) (noting male-female interactions that are 
status-ordered “continually refresh[]” gender status beliefs). 
236 See Samuel L. Gaertner et al., How Does Cooperation Reduce Intergroup Bias?, 
59 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 692 (1990). 
237 See generally Gaertner & Dovidio, Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common In-
group Identity Model, supra note 51.  
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are generalized beyond the conditions of the interaction itself, to 
other members of the outside group.238 
Intergroup contact also breaks down boundaries between groups 
and reduces people’s anxiety about each other,239 motivating them 
to disclose things to each other, and even establish friendships.240 
These ties promote empathy, and reduce the sense of threat and 
alienation that otherwise leads them to treat others as individuals 
rather than as members of alien groups, and thus have more posi-
tive attitudes toward one another.241 This openness may help to ex-
plain, more generally, why diversity within a person’s networks 
causes people to be less fixed in their own views, and more careful 
about assessing new information and attitudes.242 
This research, taken together, reveals that reducing discrimina-
tory attitudes entails a combination of cognitive and motivational 
factors. Effort can make a difference, if it is motivated positively, 
238 See Rupert Brown et al., Changing Attitudes Through Intergroup Contact: The 
Effects of Group Membership Salience, 29 Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 741 (1999); Matthew 
J. Hornsey & Michael A. Hogg, Assimilation and Diversity: An Integrative Model of 
Subgroup Relations, 4 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Rev. 143, 148 (2000); Alberto Voci 
& Miles Hewstone, Intergroup Contact and Prejudice Toward Immigrants in Italy: 
The Mediational Role of Anxiety and the Moderational Role of Group Salience, 6 
Group Processes & Intergroup Rel. 37, 38–39 (2003); see also Christopher Wolsko et 
al., Framing Interethnic Ideology: Effects of Multicultural and Color-Blind Perspec-
tives on Judgments of Groups and Individuals, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 635, 
648–49 (2000) (describing experiments suggesting that multi-cultural framework led 
to stereotypes that were stronger than those generated by color-blind perspective, but 
also more accurate and more attentive to individuating information). 
239 Alberto Voci & Miles Hewstone, supra note 238, at 37–38. 
240 See Nurcan Ensari & Norman Miller, The Out-Group Must Not Be So Bad After 
All: The Effects of Disclosure, Typicality, and Salience on Intergroup Bias, 83 J. Per-
sonality & Soc. Psychol. 313, 325 (2002); Thomas F. Pettigrew, Intergroup Contact 
Theory, 49 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 65, 72 (1998). The importance of self-disclosure in im-
proving explicit attitude toward members of other groups through empathy and trust 
is explored in Rhiannon N. Turner et al., Reducing Explicit and Implicit Outgroup 
Prejudice Via Direct and Extended Contact: The Mediating Role of Self-Disclosure 
and Intergroup Anxiety, 93 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 369, 383–84 (2007). 
241 See Thomas F. Pettigrew, Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice, 
23 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 173, 174 (1997) (describing “deprovincializa-
tion”); Pettigrew & Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory, su-
pra note 231, at 766 (concluding based upon a meta-analysis that attitudes changed 
from intergroup contact generalize to other members of the outgroup and in other 
situations). 
242 See Lindsey Clark Levitan & Penny S. Visser, The Impact of the Social Context 
on Resistance to Persuasion: Effortful Versus Effortless Responses to Counter-
Attitudinal Information, 44 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 640, 646 (2007). 
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to build upon accepted values and internal norms. Situational in-
fluences are important to that motivation, the content of the 
norms, and the likelihood that people will internalize those norms. 
Part V brings these findings to bear on strategies for reducing im-
plicit discrimination. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF MOTIVATION ANALYSIS FOR LEGAL AND 
STRUCTURAL REFORM 
Part IV explained how effort and situational factors that inform 
people of the positive views of others and stimulate interactions 
between members of different groups have the potential to alter 
the attitudes and beliefs that cause discriminatory behavior. This 
Part evaluates the reform proposals that were outlined briefly in 
Part II in light of the social science evidence accumulated in Parts 
III and IV. It concludes that clear, enforceable, and enforced stan-
dards prohibiting workplace discrimination are necessary to reduc-
ing it, but that legal rules that are perceived as unfair, or that are 
experienced as unnecessarily coercive, will undermine people’s 
needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness, and thereby 
diminish their internalization of nondiscrimination values. Strong 
legal standards can deter provable instances of discrimination and 
compensate victims, and they define desirable norms. The law, 
however, cannot reach the more hidden and ambiguous forms of 
discrimination, no matter how forcefully it tries to prohibit them. 
Instead of relying entirely on threats and coercion, which may even 
make discrimination worse, nondiscrimination strategies must also 
take account of people’s need for a sense of autonomy, compe-
tence, and relatedness. 
A. Legal Reform Proposals 
Proposals designed to clarify that a successful employment dis-
crimination case under Title VII does not require a showing of de-
liberate race or gender animus do not raise the concerns high-
lighted in this Article. Knowing that one is responsible for one’s 
actions—even if one is not aware that those actions are discrimina-
tory—challenges people to be more thoughtful and careful about 
their decisions. Accordingly, Title VII was drafted and has been in-
terpreted to prohibit behaviors that discriminate “because of” race, 
BARTLETT_BOOK 11/18/2009  6:10 PM 
2009] Making Good on Good Intentions 1957 
 
gender, or other protected characteristic, not just those that are 
consciously discriminatory.243 By definition, implicit discrimination 
would be put beyond the law’s reach if showing that one had an 
honest belief that one was acting in a nondiscriminatory fashion at 
the time in question, or had so acted in the past, was an adequate 
defense.244 Good intentions are not a “free pass” to discrimination 
and should never exonerate a defendant from liability for conduct 
that adversely treats someone because of a characteristic protected 
by Title VII.245 
Several proposals, however, not only make discriminatory intent 
irrelevant to a Title VII case, but they also abandon the necessity 
for establishing a causal link between an employment decision and 
a victim’s race, sex, or other protected characteristic.246 These pro-
posals alter the basic liability standard so that even a person who 
has not treated someone differently because of their race or sex 
may be found to have done so. Rules that impose liability without 
guilty intent are one thing; rules that impose liability for discrimi-
nation that has not occurred are another, and are likely to stimu-
late the negative effects examined in this Article. 
Ann McGinley’s proposed mandatory presumption against the 
employer if the employer offers an explanation for an employment 
decision that turns out to be false247 has this potential risk. Dis-
crimination is too complex a phenomenon to try to prove or dis-
prove through conclusive presumptions. Decisionmaking in the 
employment context is not monolithic, and supervisors frequently 
act for a number of reasons. As the law now provides, offering a 
nondiscriminatory justification that is later shown not to have been 
the “real reason” may support an inference of discrimination, but it 
should not be a conclusive basis for assuming it.248 If proof of hon-
esty is not enough to rebut discrimination,249 neither should proof 
of falsehood prove it. Legally mandating a finding of discrimina-
243 See supra Section II.A. 
244 See id. 
245 Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“good intent or absence 
of discriminatory intent does not redeem” practices that violate Title VII). 
246 See supra Section II.B. 
247 McGinley, supra note 17, at 482. 
248 For examples of possible fact situations, see supra text accompanying note 121. 
249 See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 99, at 1034–38 (criticizing the “honest belief” 
rule). 
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tion on the basis of a lie is no more fair than requiring that a lie is 
not enough,250 or mandating a finding for the defendant if the plain-
tiff is caught in a lie. The appearance of neutrality is essential to 
the moral force of Title VII, which in turn is essential to people’s 
internalization of its nondiscrimination norms. An approach that 
ignores the costs of false findings of discrimination fosters a per-
ception of unfairness, and the anxieties of being found guilty while 
innocent under these rules may drive people, inadvertently, to act 
in more stereotyped ways. 
Russell Robinson’s proposal for dual-track liability to provide 
relief in close cases that an “outsider” would find compelling, even 
if an “insider” would not,251 also seems unnecessarily provocative, 
as well as impossible to implement even-handedly. The proposal 
highlights the important fact that insiders and outsiders see bias 
differently. Like proposed rules that alter burden of proof rules to 
eliminate the causation requirement, however, the Robinson pro-
posal would short-circuit the question of whether a person was 
treated differently in the workplace “because of” a prohibited 
characteristic, and instead would assume a connection between a 
person’s identity status and how they were treated in a particular 
case under a general theory of the prevalence of discrimination. It 
is one thing to say that discrimination should be found even if con-
scious intent was lacking. It is another to say that discrimination 
should be found because it often occurs but will not be provable 
without a rule that presumes it.252 Proposals that convert ambiguity 
into certainty associate Title VII with a conspicuous rule of favorit-
ism and encourage defensive, stereotyped reactions. We need to 
get better at identifying discrimination, without assuming that it ex-
ists in the absence of actual proof. 
Proposals designed to hold employers liable for workplace pro-
cedures and structures that could give rein to unconscious bias, 
even if not shown to do so, have similar problems. David Oppen-
heimer proposes to have courts second-guess all workplace deci-
250 At one time, proving the lie was not enough. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). This rule was reversed in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 
Products., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000), holding that an inference of discrimination 
could be made based on the lie, although the inference is not required. 
251 Robinson, supra note 8, at 1166–67. 
252 See Wax, The Discriminating Mind, supra note 12. 
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sions involving women and minorities.253 Tristin Green does the 
same with respect to workplace procedures that may inadvertently 
contribute to ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias, or that do not 
protect members of disadvantaged groups from responding badly 
to perceived bias.254 In some workplaces with entrenched habits, 
procedures, and attitudes, greater surveillance may be beneficial, 
but existing Title VII law should be able to identify these cases and 
mandate remedial regimes that address the problems.255 Imposing 
surveillance regimes on all workplaces ignores the impact of exces-
sive suspicion and micromanagement on the kind of trust, organ-
izational esprit, and commitment to nondiscrimination norms.256 
Employer liability for workplace practices that could hypotheti-
cally permit biased decisions, but have not been shown to do so, 
pushes people into defensive, resentful responses. If the goal is 
good decisionmaking relative to race, gender, and other protected 
characteristics, this is the wrong “nudge.”257 
Rules imposing employer liability based on potential rather than 
actual discrimination also will tend to generate from employers 
more of the standard liability-based bullet-proofing measures, such 
as diversity training and various mechanical reporting require-
ments that, as discussed in the next Section,258 have not proved ef-
fective. These measures are motivated more by the goal of avoid-
ing costly judgments than by reducing discrimination. Added 
pressure may lead employers to adopt the proposal of some schol-
ars that all prospective employees be given the Implicit Association 
Test.259 These tests are easy enough to administer, but are unlikely 
253 Oppenheimer, supra note 94, at 970. 
254 Green, supra note 18, at 856–57, 899–903. 
255 Dukes et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007), granting re-
hearing en banc 556 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2009) (certifying a class of 1.5 million female 
employees of Wal-Mart who alleged systematic discrimination in hiring and promo-
tion practices). 
256 Cialdini, supra note 160, at 56–57; see supra text accompanying note 160. 
257 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (2008) (urging more thought-
fulness to how decisions are structured for people, to encourage them to make deci-
sions that are best for themselves and others). 
258 See infra Section V.B. 
259 See Ian Ayres, Pervasive Prejudice? Unconventional Evidence of Race and Gen-
der Discrimination 424–25 (2001) (advocating IAT scores as a criterion for hiring 
both governmental and nongovernmental actors); Kang & Banaji, supra note 5, at 
1091. Some have even argued in favor of using the IAT test in the course of litigation, 
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to amount to any meaningful workplace change—since almost eve-
ryone registers bias on these tests—and may only increase anxiety 
and denial, which enhances bias.260 
B. Structural Reform Proposals  
A comprehensive study of the efficacy of diversity promotion ef-
forts, using federal data over a thirty-year period, concludes that 
diversity training and diversity evaluations are the least effective in 
enhancing diversity.  Meanwhile, mentoring programs and net-
working efforts show modest positive effects, and accountability 
mechanisms show the greatest improvement in organization diver-
sity.261 Based on both experimental studies and field research, re-
searchers have concluded also that collaborative workplace cul-
tures,262 the reduction in status differentials within work groups,263 
and job rotation programs264 all seem to reduce stereotyping as well 
as improve prospects for women and members of racial minorities 
in the workplace. 
A focus on promoting people’s good intentions makes sense of 
these research conclusions. For example, researchers believe that it 
is important for people to be aware of their biases.265 Yet, while 
many have urged education as the primary means of improving at-
as probative of whether the defendant discriminated. See Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious 
Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
481, 501–02 (2005). 
260 For the same reason, the suggested use of required, “de-biasing” screensavers is 
equally unpromising. For the suggestion, see Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 
Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1536–37 (2005). Voluntary IAT testing and screensavers are, of 
course, another matter. 
261 Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of 
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 Am. Soc. Rev. 589, 611 
(2006). 
262 See, e.g., Samuel B. Bacharach et al., Diversity and Homophily at Work: Suppor-
tive Relations Among White and African-American Peers, 48 Acad. Mgmt. J. 619, 
620 (2005). 
263 Green & Kalev, supra note 34, at 1445–49. 
264 Id. at 1450–52. 
265 See Devine & Monteith, supra note 181, at 346; Fiske, supra note 44, at 364; Wil-
son & Brekke, supra note 180, at 119–20; see also Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, 
Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice, 44 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 164, 171 
(2008) (noting that people’s implicit belief that they are prejudiced moderates the ef-
fect of unconscious stereotypes). 
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titudes,266 training programs have a poor success record.267 Why is 
this? Based on what we know about what motivates people to 
change their stereotyped attitudes about other people, a reason-
able hypothesis is that training programs too often communicate to 
their intended audiences the message that individuals need to be 
taught not to discriminate because right now they do not know any 
better. Most people already know that it is wrong to be prejudiced; 
the problem is that, left to their own devices, they too often unwit-
tingly engage in it.268 “Preaching about the evils of prejudice would 
likely be ineffective [to people who] already agree with the mes-
sage and regard themselves to be nonprejudiced.”269 In the vocabu-
lary of motivation, telling people that they would discriminate if 
they were allowed to do so, or unless they were taught not to do so, 
undermines their senses of autonomy, competence, relatedness, 
and basic goodness.270 Diversity training programs ignore this in-
266 See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby & Susan Clayton, Affirmative Action: Psychological 
Contributions to Policy, 1 Analyses Soc. Issues & Pub. Pol’y 71, 81 (2001). 
267 Rebecca S. Bigler, The Use of Multicultural Curricula and Materials to Counter 
Racism in Children, 55 J. Soc. Issues 687, 699–701 (1999) (concluding that diversity 
training often heightens rather than reduces race bias in children, and that use of 
counterstereotypes within the curriculum and more attention to tasks requiring chil-
dren to attend to similarities and differences among individuals of different races 
would be more effective); Susan Bisom-Rapp, An Ounce of Prevention Is a Poor Sub-
stitute for a Pound of Cure: Confronting the Developing Jurisprudence of Education 
and Prevention in Employment Discrimination Law, 22 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 1, 
4 (2001) (noting little evidence that education and training programs work and argu-
ing that they may have a polarizing effect on employee attitudes); Kalev et al., supra 
note 261, at 593–94 (reviewing studies); see also James A. Banks, Multicultural Edu-
cation: Its Effects on Students’ Racial and Gender Role Attitudes, in Handbook of 
Research on Multicultural Education 617, 624 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee 
Banks eds., 1995) (concluding that the effects of multicultural education programs are 
“inconsistent”). 
268 See Bonita London et al., Studying Institutional Engagement: Utilizing Social 
Psychology Research Methodologies to Study Law Student Engagement, 30 Harv. 
J.L. & Gender 389, 395 (2007) (noting that law students recognize the value of diver-
sity, but they fail to successfully integrate in their own voluntary intergroup actions). 
269 Gaertner & Dovidio, Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Racism, su-
pra note 8, at 626. 
270 See supra text accompanying notes 136–139; see also Laurie A. Rudman et al., 
“Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereo-
types, 81 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 856, 857 (2001) (noting that people “perceive 
a threat to their freedom of expression or [are] offended by the implication that they 
are prejudiced”). 
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sight, and thus are highly unpopular among workers.271 Programs 
that employers want courts to be able to easily recognize as reme-
dial in nature tend to be poorly designed to motivate people to do 
the self-examination necessary to reduce unconscious bias. Instead, 
they raise hackles and are often the butt of office jokes.272 The resis-
tance to these programs, itself, increases the likelihood that they 
will backfire.273 
In contrast, collaborative work cultures that minimize status dif-
ferentials address the conditions that feed stereotyped thinking. 
Working together allows people to get to know each other and mo-
tivates them to form accurate assessments of one another, not 
stereotyped ones.274 Collaboration puts people in situations in 
which they are more likely to share the personal information upon 
which common bonds can be formed, and are thus less likely to 
stereotype. People feel more valued and secure in such institu-
tional cultures275 and thus better able to internally absorb work-
place values as their own. 
271 They appear to be especially unpopular among male employees. See Deborah L. 
Kidder et al., Backlash Toward Diversity Initiatives: Examining the Impact of Diver-
sity Program Justification, Personal and Group Outcomes, 15 Int’l J. Conflict Mgmt. 
77, 93 (2004) (noting that women are more positive than men toward diversity-related 
programs); Sara Rynes & Benson Rosen, A Field Survey of Factors Affecting the 
Adoption and Perceived Success of Diversity Training, 48 Personnel Psychol. 247, 262 
(1995) (reporting that men perceive diversity programs as less successful than women 
do). 
272 See Patricia G. Devine et al., Breaking the Prejudice Habit: Progress and Obsta-
cles, in Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination 185, 193 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) 
(recounting reports of senior Texaco executives’ derision of their own diversity train-
ing programs). 
273 See Kawakami et al., Kicking the Habit, supra note 194, at 74. 
274 See Fiske & Neuberg, supra note 195, at 38, 46–49; Norman Miller, Personaliza-
tion and the Promise of Contact Theory, 58 J. Soc. Issues 387, 391 (2002). One re-
finement on this general principle is that one-on-one competition appears to facilitate 
individuating impressions of opponents, while group-on-group competition fosters 
stereotyping. See Fiske et al., The Continuum Model, supra note 36, at 242. 
275 See Gerhard Daday & Beverly Burris, Technocratic Teamwork: Mitigating Po-
larization and Cultural Marginalization in an Engineering Firm, in The Transforma-
tion of Work 241, 254, 257 (Steven P. Vallas ed., 2001); see also Laurel Smith-Doerr, 
Women’s Work: Gender Equality vs. Hierarchy in the Life Sciences 28–29, 147–48 
(2004) (noting that women and minority scientists are more productive and do better 
in a network structures); Vicki Smith, Employee Involvement, Involved Employees: 
Participative Work Arrangements in a White-Collar Service Occupation, 43 Soc. 
Probs. 166, 177–78 (1996) (concluding that employee involvement programs benefit 
minorities by improving white-collar interactional skill sets). 
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Job rotation schemes, which have been successful in many work-
places,276 work because they build a sense of competence, as well as 
autonomy and connectedness, making it more likely that people 
will internalize workplace nondiscrimination goals. These measures 
tend to enhance contact across groups, providing opportunities to 
form individual relationships that discourage group stereotyping. 
They also make more visible how the many parts of an operation 
contribute to a productive whole, which fosters a sense of interde-
pendence and competence. 
Accountability is widely praised as a way to reduce discrimina-
tion.277 A focus on motivation helps to fashion an accountability 
system that motivates people in a positive, constructive way. Ac-
countability works when it motivates people to become more self-
critical and to make more accurate, individuating (that is, non-
stereotyping) decisions.278 When people know that their judgments 
of another person will be checked against the assessments of others 
whom they respect, they will want to form more careful judg-
ments,279 and they will alter their attitudes accordingly.280 Similarly, 
people are more likely to shift attitudes in a positive direction 
when it is clear what is expected, as long as it does not require 
compromising basic convictions and preserves their sense of 
autonomy.281 People need to know they will be accountable before 
276 See, e.g., Ian M. Taplin, Flexible Production, Rigid Jobs: Lessons from the Cloth-
ing Industry, 22 Work & Occupations 412, 416–17 (1995). 
277 Bielby, supra note 180, at 125–26. 
278 Tetlock & Lerner, supra note 196, at 581–82 
279 See Pennington & Schlenker, supra note 196, at 1078. 
280 Tetlock & Lerner, supra note 196, at 572 (“Accountability can affect not only 
what people say they think, but also how they actually do think.”); see also Fiske & 
Neuberg, supra note 195, at 41–42 (collecting studies that link the desire to form an 
accurate impression with an awareness that the impression will be shared); Penning-
ton & Schlenker, supra note 196, at 1076–80 (describing the effects of knowing to 
which audience the study participants would have to defend their decision in a face-
to-face meeting even when the anticipated meeting was cancelled before the partici-
pants wrote their decisions). 
281 Tetlock and Lerner note, for example, that the decisionmaker will not want to 
create dissonance with his own self-concept or to appear to others to be hypocritical 
or sycophantic. Tetlock & Lerner, supra note 196, at 575. It is also important that the 
people to whom they are accountable act consistently themselves with the norms they 
articulate. See Tony Simons et al., Racial Differences in Sensitivity to Behavioral In-
tegrity: Attitudinal Consequences, In-Group Effects, and “Trickle Down” Among 
Black and Non-Black Employees, 92 J. Applied Psychol. 650, 658 (2007); Tetlock & 
Lerner, supra note 196 at 577. 
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they collect the evidence on which they must base their judgments, 
not after it is too late to guide their performance, when account-
ability will be experienced as negative and unfair.282 
Accountability systems do not reduce discrimination when they 
motivate people to avoid criticism or to “become mired in self-
justification.”283 Accountability systems that amount to second-
guessing decisions after the fact do not work well284 because they 
undermine people’s sense of competence and autonomy and make 
them act defensively. When accountability systems appear to bribe 
decisionmakers or convey the message that without accountability 
they cannot be trusted to do the job, they undermine intrinsic mo-
tivation and thus are also less likely to de-bias decisionmaking.285 
Giving people sufficient autonomy to experiment and take risks is 
a better way to build the trust necessary for them to invest them-
selves fully in the underlying goals.286 
Positive feedback is generally viewed as autonomy- and compe-
tence-enhancing, and has been shown to enhance intrinsic motiva-
tion under some conditions; negative feedback, in contrast, tends 
to undermine people’s sense of effectiveness and thus intrinsic mo-
tivation.287 Accordingly, positive feedback has also been tied to a 
reduction in race stereotyping, and negative feedback to an in-
crease in race stereotyping.288 For people to be internally motivated 
by positive feedback, however, they must feel responsible and en-
gaged. Being praised for an outcome in which one played little 
role, or which was poorly executed, can create a sense of disso-
282 Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and the Perseverance of First Impressions, 46 
Soc. Psychol. Q. 285, 290 (1983); Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Il Kim, Accountability and 
Judgment Processes in a Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. Personality & Soc. Psy-
chol. 700, 706 (1987); Tetlock & Lerner, supra note 196, at 577–78. 
283 Tetlock & Lerner, supra note 196, at 572. 
284 Id. at 576–77. 
285 See id. at 581–82. Thus, rewards that are unexpected are better than bribes be-
cause they make the individual feel more responsible for the achievement. See Deci 
et al., Extrinsic Reward and Intrinsic Motivation in Education, supra note 166, at 13–
14. 
286 Cf. Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 13, at 314 (describing how 
National Science Foundation builds relationship with grantees around trust, collabo-
ration, risk-taking, and experimentation). 
287 Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 234–35 
(citing studies); see also sources in supra note 202. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 68–72. 
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nance, guilt, or inadequacy, rather than autonomy and compe-
tence. To have a positive effect on self-esteem, feedback should be 
genuinely affirming rather than controlling or manipulative.289 The 
form in which feedback is delivered matters. Informational feed-
back that affirms the need for accurate decisions reinforces peo-
ple’s sense of competence and responsibility. Didactic feedback is 
more likely to be experienced as judgmental or conditional, and 
thus as coercive.290 Research also shows that feedback that rein-
forces the purpose and value of the performance promotes the 
process of internalization better than feedback based solely on a 
do-as-you-are-told message.291 Threats, deadlines, pressured 
evaluations, and imposed goals—where the justifications are not 
well understood—will tend to diminish intrinsic motivation, while 
opportunities for self-direction, and the acknowledgment of feel-
ings tend to enhance it.292 
Focusing on motivation helps to unpack various conundrums 
that have plagued scholars attempting to ascertain the best ap-
proaches to reducing unconscious bias. For example, while some 
research shows that guilt causes people to be less biased, other re-
search shows the opposite. The discrepancy makes sense when 
guilt is connected to the quality of a person’s motivation to be un-
biased. People who have a well-internalized motivation to avoid 
prejudice respond to cues that they may be stereotyping with 
heightened attention, introspection, and effort to control stereotyp-
ing in future situations. In one study involving the review of law 
school applications, subjects who had high levels of internal moti-
vation took more time to evaluate others after being told that their 
previous answers might have been influenced by the applicant’s 
sexual orientation.293 Test subjects without such internalized stan-
289 See Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 
235. 
290 See Deci et al., Extrinsic Reward and Intrinsic Motivation in Education, supra 
note 166, at 3, 12. 
291 Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 238 
(citing studies). So does acknowledging people’s feelings that the activity is not inter-
esting. Id. 
292 See Ryan & Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic 
Motivation, supra note 143, at 70 (citing studies). 
293 Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for 
Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 469, 473, 
477 (1993). They also responded more slowly to jokes about gays. Id. at 482. 
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dards made quicker evaluations in the next round, suggesting that 
the effect of the feedback was to make them more eager to avoid 
thinking about their prejudice, rather than to eliminate it.294 This 
research suggests that guilt can motivate people who have strongly 
internalized personal standards,295 but the threat associated with an-
ticipated punishment or disapproval of others may fuel anger 
among those without such motivation.296 Anger and shame, in turn, 
increase the likelihood of stereotyping.297 
The quality of a person’s motivation can also help to explain 
otherwise puzzling evidence about the effects of confronting peo-
ple about their bias. Researchers have found that the confrontation 
of those who utter stereotypes often generates apology, self-
criticism, and subsequent positive changes in behavior among those 
who are motivated to avoid prejudice. But it makes other people 
defensive and heightens their stereotypic responses.298 One signifi-
cant variable is the quality of the confrontation. Hostile confronta-
tions are threatening, even to low-prejudiced people, because they 
impugn a person’s sense of integrity.299 In reaction, people often 
conclude that “complainers” are hypersensitive.300 Low-key con-
frontations are less threatening and thus tend to be more produc-
tive.301 The motivation of the person being confronted also matters. 
294 Id. They also showed no moderation in their reaction to the homophobic jokes. 
Id. For other research developing the self-regulatory model of prejudice reduction, 
see Monteith et al., supra note 184; Margo J. Monteith & Aimee Y. Mark, Changing 
One’s Prejudiced Ways: Awareness, Affect, and Self-Regulation, 16 Eur. Rev. Soc. 
Psychol. 113 (2005). 
295 Devine et al., supra note 272, at 188–92. 
296 Id. at 193–200. 
297 See Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, supra note 44, at 390–91. 
298 See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Personal Narratives About Guilt: Role in Action 
Control and Interpersonal Relationships, 17 Basic & Applied Soc. Psychol. 173, 187–
88 (1995); Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of 
Making Attributions to Discrimination, 27 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 254 
(2001); Monteith & Mark, supra note 294, at 146–47. 
299 See Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing Up for a Change: Reducing Bias 
Through Interpersonal Confrontation, 90 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 784, 785, 791 
(2006) (reporting studies and further research indicating that even though hostile con-
frontations produced negative evaluations of the confronter, they also seemed to curb 
subsequent stereotyping); Monteith & Mark, supra note 294, at 147. 
300 See Kaiser & Miller, supra note 298, at 261. 
301 See Czopp & Monteith, supra note 1, at 541. According to one study, confronta-
tions of whites by other whites are less expected, less threatening, and more trustwor-
thy, and thus more likely to promote a processing of the message. Id. at 534, 542; see 
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Those who have internalized a desire to avoid discrimination are 
able to respond to confrontation positively and with a willingness 
to correct their behavior.302 For people with high levels of preju-
dice, however, even relatively gentle encounters can be threatening 
and unproductive. These people are more likely to perceive con-
fronters as unreasonable and thus to respond with hostility and 
self-justification.303 
The conflicting data about the effects of affirmative plans also 
make more sense when motivational principles are considered. 
Numerous studies suggest that affirmative action programs devalue 
or stigmatize real and apparent beneficiaries.304 Yet the impact is 
less, and the acceptance by other people can be greatly enhanced, 
if programs are explained well,305 especially if they can be justified 
in terms of social norms and business rationales.306 Policies that fo-
cus on recruitment of underrepresented groups to hire good people 
also Richard E. Petty et al., Individual Versus Group Interest Violation: Surprise as a 
Determinant of Argument Scrutiny and Persuasion, 19 Soc. Cognition 418, 430 (2001) 
(noting that people are considered more trustworthy when they advocate positions 
against their own self-interest, but not when they advocate positions against group 
interest). Still, some researchers  conclude that confrontations may have positive long-
term effects “through a sustained, strategic, and collective effort,” even if they cause 
short-term resistance. Czopp & Monteith, supra note 1, at 541. 
302 Czopp & Monteith, supra note 1, at 540–42. 
303 Id. at 541. “High-prejudice people may be more influenced by [appeals to] uni-
versal norms of fairness and egalitarianism.” Id. at 542. Both high- and low-prejudice 
people felt more guilty and more uncomfortable when confronted about a biased re-
sponse against blacks than when the response was against women. Id. at 541–42.  
304 See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman & Brian Welle, Disadvantaged by Diversity? The 
Effects of Diversity Goals on Competence Perceptions, 36 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 
1291, 1292 (2006); Kidder et al., supra note 271; Miriam G. Resendez, The Stigmatiz-
ing Effects of Affirmative Action: An Examination of Moderating Variables, 32 J. 
Applied Soc. Psychol. 185, 202 (2002).  
305 See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 160, at 50 (“Just as strong external incen-
tives retard internalization, using reasoning in preference to power-assertion tends to 
promote it.”); David A. Harrison et al., Understanding Attitudes Toward Affirmative 
Action Programs in Employment: Summary and Meta-Analysis of 35 Years of Re-
search, 91 J. Applied Psychol. 1013, 1030 (2006) (conducting a meta-analysis of stud-
ies highlighting the importance of people understanding reasons for affirmative action 
plans); Orlando C. Richard & Susan L. Kirby, Women Recruits’ Perceptions of 
Workforce Diversity Program Selection Decisions: A Procedural Justice Examina-
tion, 28 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 183, 184–87 (1998) (reporting that women given justi-
fication for diversity hiring suffer less negative self-perceptions than when given no 
justification); see also supra text accompanying note 159. 
306 See Kidder et al., supra note 271, at 93. 
BARTLETT_BOOK 11/18/2009  6:10 PM 
1968 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 95:1893 
 
and retain employees who reflect the diversity of their customer 
base are better accepted among both beneficiaries and potential 
opponents of policies.307 In contrast, measures that appear to favor 
members of protected groups at the expense of identifiable, seem-
ingly deserving majority workers and are justified simply by the 
underrepresentation of the target group tend to provoke resistance 
to affirmative action more generally.308 This resistance was appar-
ent in the highly negative public response to the City of New Ha-
ven’s decision not to certify the results of a firefighters’ promotion 
exam under which no black and only two Hispanic firefighters 
could have obtained promotions.309 From the perspective of motiva-
tion analysis, although New Haven never should have used a stan-
dardized, multiple-choice test to assess leadership potential,310 once 
the city proceeded to use the test, it should have accepted the re-
sults and then simply discontinued future use of the test. The mis-
understandings about affirmative action generated by the Ricci v. 
DeStefano311 decision—misunderstandings legitimized by the Su-
preme Court’s decision in the case—have probably set back the 
307 See Russell Cropanzano et al., Organizational Justice and Black Applicants’ Re-
actions to Affirmative Action, 90 J. Applied Psychol. 1168, 1179–81 (2005); Heather 
Golden et al., Reactions to Affirmative Action: Substance and Semantics, 31 J. Ap-
plied Soc. Psychol. 73, 77, 80–82 (2001) (concluding that plans perceived as monitor-
ing plans are better accepted than preferential hiring); Harrison et al., supra note 305, 
at 1020–28 (highly prescriptive affirmative action plans create greater resistance); 
Kidder, supra note 271, at 85, 88–89 (business priority justification associated with 
greater support toward affirmative action than concern about meeting affirmative ac-
tion goals to adhere to EEOC guidelines for minority representation). 
308 See Harrison et al., supra note 305, at 1020–28 (concluding that the rationale of 
better representation of underrepresented groups decreased support for affirmative 
action, especially among those who perceive that the plan is not in their self-interest, 
and when the plan is highly prescriptive). 
309 See, e.g., Posting of Barry Friedman to The Plank, http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-
plank/why-lsquoriccirsquo-should-frighten-democrats (June 30, 2009, 14:19 EST) (ar-
guing that Ricci, because of its sympathetic plaintiff-victim, revives Americans’ am-
bivalence toward affirmative action and thus may weaken their commitment to it); see 
also Posting of Ed Kilgore to FiveThirtyEight, http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/ 
06/obama-sptomayor-and-affirmative-action.html (June 30, 2009, 17:09 EST) (show-
ing that 65 percent of public support white firefighters in suit against New Haven, 
even though a Quinnipiac poll shows that 63 percent support affirmative action as 
long as rigid quotas are ruled out) (URL correct as displayed). 
310 See Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, Trial by Firefighters, N.Y. Times, July 11, 2009, 
at A17. 
311 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
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support for affirmative action that is critical to the reduction of im-
plicit workplace bias. 
More generally, motivation principles help to illuminate current 
debates about the significance of structural reform in the work-
place. Some argue that changing institutional structures is more ef-
fective than changing individuals or the law.312 Others argue that in-
ternal reform tends to be co-opted by risk-management principles, 
amounting to “symbolic responses” without advancing the goals of 
equality and inclusion.313 A major contribution of Susan Sturm’s re-
search has been a framework for distinguishing the reforms that 
have the potential to transform institutions from those likely to 
simply perpetuate existing patterns. One promising strategy, she 
argues, is the development of collaborative problem-solving 
mechanisms through which non-judicial actors can promote diver-
sity in the workplace.314 Research by Sturm, Frank Dobbin, and Al-
exandra Kalev has also greatly improved understanding of the 
312 See, e.g., Green & Kalev, supra note 34; Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination, supra note 13, at 461–63; Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra 
note 13, at 249.  
313 See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Sub-
stance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 959, 962 
(1999) (noting that preventative institutional practices undertaken to limit legal liabil-
ity “may mask rather than eliminate some discriminatory decisions”); Lauren B. 
Edelman, Law at Work: The Endogenous Construction of Civil Rights, in Handbook 
of Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities 337, 340–45 (Laura 
Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005) (arguing that law is transformed by the 
organizational institutions that it is designed to control); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal 
Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 
97 Am. J. Soc. 1531, 1542–43 (1992) (“symbolic responses” occur when employers in-
fluence the meaning of employment discrimination laws through the internal proce-
dures and structures they develop to comply with those laws); Lauren B. Edelman & 
Mark C. Suchman, When the “Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the Organiza-
tional Internalization of Law, 33 L. & Soc’y Rev. 941, 985 (1999) (repeat player or-
ganizations annex law for their own purposes); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Com-
pliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U. L. Q. 487, 487 (2003) 
(internal compliance mechanisms “may largely serve a window-dressing function that 
provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability”); see also Bisom-Rapp, 
An Ounce of Prevention, supra note 267 at 27–29 (courts increasingly treat education 
and training programs as evidence of nondiscrimination, which represents acceptance 
of form over substance). 
314 See Susan Sturm, Law’s Role in Addressing Complex Discrimination, in Hand-
book of Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities 35 (Laura Beth 
Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employ-
ment Discrimination, supra note 13. 
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kinds of structural reforms that are most likely to make a differ-
ence in reducing bias. This research concludes that responsibility 
for diversity should be spread across the institution rather than fo-
cused in a single individual or administrative office; that in-house 
experts have advantages over outside consultants in building insti-
tutional diversity goals; that top management should be both di-
verse and committed to diversity; and that use of positive program 
incentives is more productive than legal compliance mechanisms, 
such as EEOC charges and lawsuits.315 
Principles of internal motivation help to explain these research 
findings and suggest ways to apply them more effectively. Each of 
the successful strategies support employee autonomy, competence, 
and relatedness. They rely on clear norms and provide opportuni-
ties for people to develop. Leadership and ownership are both 
critical. For institutional goals to have salience and credibility, the 
institution must reflect those values from the top. Employees can 
tell the difference between company leaders who model commit-
ment to a diverse and inclusive workplace  and those who act pri-
marily from an aversion to legal liability.316 Those who model com-
mitment motivate others to do the same; those acting from an 
aversion to legal liability motivate cynicism and, at best, rote com-
pliance. In turn, opportunities for people to “freely process and 
endorse transmitted values and regulations”317 and to experience 
personal growth, feeling valued, and engagement give them a sense 
of ownership or what Susan Sturm calls institutional citizenship.318 
315 See Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, The Architecture of Inclusion: Evidence 
From Corporate Diversity Programs, 30 Harv. J.L. & Gender 279, 292, 294–95, 300–01 
(2007) (corporate context); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 
13, at 247, 251, 300, 312–13 (in educational setting). 
316 In their study of the characteristics that make diversity programs effective in the 
corporate world, Professors Frank Dobbin and Alexandra Kalev identify strong lead-
ership as a key component. See Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 316, at 295. 
317 Deci & Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits, supra note 20, at 238. 
318 See Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion, supra note 13, at 323–27. Sturm de-
scribes and analyzes the National Science Foundation’s ADVANCE program for in-
creasing the number of women in science and engineering. The program uses institu-
tional transformation grants to support institutional change through data collection, 
data analysis, self-study, integrated strategies for improvement, monitoring and pro-
gram assessment, and sharing of best practices. See id. at 277–334; see also David A. 
Thomas & Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing 
Diversity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 79, 85–87 (urging paradigm for inclu-
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Without such opportunities, a job is just a job, not a shared enter-
prise whose institutional values are worth internalizing. Likewise, 
measures that make responsibility for various institutional goals 
diffuse, rather than someone else’s bailiwick, foster institutional 
buy-in and stronger potential attachment to those goals. Without 
such commitment, people come to attribute their own compliance 
to the coercion, rather than their own values—an attribution that, 
as this Article has explained, tends to become a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
CONCLUSION 
There are three basic approaches for trying to reduce race and 
gender discrimination in the workplace. We can (1) prohibit it; (2) 
design the workplace so that people cannot engage in it; and (3) 
change the preferences and intentions that lead to it. Legal scholar-
ship, understandably, has focused primarily on strengthening the 
legal rules that prohibit discrimination and, more recently, on pro-
posing structural changes to the workplace that may block it. 
Changes in attitudes and preferences have been considered the in-
cidental benefits of legal prohibitions and structural reforms, not 
their main, or even appropriate, purpose. Yet workplace discrimi-
nation cannot be eliminated solely through the threat of legal li-
ability or the reform of workplace institutions that this threat en-
courages. In fact, too much pressure, or the wrong kind, may 
actually make things worse. 
Faced with the frustrations of knowing that implicit discrimina-
tion exists and that the law is not effective in stopping it, there is an 
impulse to want to make the law do more. Because the law can de-
ter some discriminatory behavior, it is tempting to assume that 
more law can deter more of it; that rules that produce more positive 
outcomes for plaintiffs will deter behavior that now falls between 
the cracks; and that stricter laws will incentivize employers to try 
even harder to eliminate bias from the workplace. As to the risk of 
false positives, the ubiquity of implicit bias makes it also easy to as-
sive workplace that provides opportunities for personal development, makes workers 
feel valued, and creates an expectation of high performance). 
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sume that “the opportunities for underestimating the incidence of 
discriminatory behavior are much greater than the reverse.”319 
Against these assumptions, however, must be considered the 
importance of good intentions in bringing about change that law, 
alone, cannot compel. Further, responses to the phenomenon of 
implicit bias must be informed not only by what more rules we can 
imagine, but also by what we know now, and can learn in the fu-
ture, about the effects of various rules, institutions, and strategies 
on the good intentions that motivate people to act in nondiscrimi-
natory ways, even when the law lacks the power to compel them to 
do so. 
 
319 McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolucion!, supra note 17 at 482. 
